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1. Introduction: From a harbor of peace to civil war 
On September 19, 2002, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a military mutiny attempting to 
oust President Laurent Gbagbo from power, while at the same time rebel groups 
attacked and progressively took hold of the northern half of the country’s territory. 
What at first sight seemed as a mere soldier uprising, soon revealed a deep political 
conflict which held the potential to threaten both the peace and, according to some 
views, the territorial integrity of the country. The conflict brought Côte d’Ivoire, 
previously known as a harbor of peace and stability in the region, to the international 
fore. While some reacted with surprise and shock, others interpreted these events 
simply as the inevitable culmination of tensions that had been developing for 
decades, and which had accelerated with the coup d’état in December 1999. The 
current crisis compels us to examine the conditions under which the country has 
moved from stability to a situation of deep political crisis and instability. What 
explains the political breakdown? Through which processes, and based on which 
factors, have legitimacy, trust, and stability turned to political turmoil and civil war? 
Most literature today points to ethnic conflicts, tensions between the local population 
and immigrants, or external influences as the main factors explaining the political 
breakdown in Côte d’Ivoire. The past decades have, however, also seen a 
deterioration of economic conditions, increasing poverty and unemployment as well 
as the development of larger gaps in resources in the country. Easterly (2001:202; 
206) label the country as having had one of the world’s biggest economic collapses 
since 1978. Several academic contributions emphasize the importance of economic 
developments for the direction and sustainability of political change. It is also widely 
assumed that Structural Adjustment Programs, which in the case of Côte d’Ivoire 
were first implemented in 1981, may have wide-ranging effects on social conditions 
in developing countries. However, few have looked closer at the importance of 
economic conditions for the political breakdown in trust and legitimacy in Côte 
d’Ivoire. While several academics have focused on the economic effects of structural 
 adjustment policies, few have looked directly at the political sustainability and 
stability of the programs. On that background, this thesis discusses to what extent and 
how the political breakdown can be illuminated by economic developments and 
policies.  
1.1 Background 
In sharp contrast to its neighbors in the region, Côte d’Ivoire was for several years 
regarded as an African success story with relative economic progress and political 
stability. The country experienced a remarkable economic growth in the first two 
decades of independence, and achieved a level of welfare that was impressive when 
compared to its neighboring countries. The country’s first president, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, managed to maintain an image as the “Father of the Nation” who 
provided for the welfare of the people, and enjoyed a high popularity throughout his 
presidency, which lasted until his death in 1993. Although there was resistance, and it 
was sometimes brutally repressed1, the president managed to keep potential 
challengers to his regime on a distance, primarily through peaceful means2. 
Internationally, Houphouët was regarded by many as a “Man of Peace” (Siriex 1975). 
After the death in 1993 of president Houphouët-Boigny, the authority of the his party, 
the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), deteriorated dramatically, and 
Houphouët-Boigny's successor Henri Konan Bédié was far from obtaining the strong 
personal position of his predecessor. Political tension and social protest, which had 
been growing during the 1980s in response to growing economic hardships and 
political repression, accelerated under Bédié. 
In 1990 pressure from the opposition coupled with international pressure for 
democratization led to the legalization of opposition parties, and the first multiparty 
election were held in October 1990. The transition to multipartyism created a new 
 
1 See chapter 2. 
2 These, however, often involved “buying off” opponents by offering them positions in his party 
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 situation where the country’s high proportion of immigrants for the first time gave 
rise to major political controversies.  
With multiparty elections, the right to vote suddenly gained importance. 
Traditionally, African immigrants had enjoyed the right to vote even without 
citizenship. This group was known to be among Houphouët-Boigny’s most loyal 
supporters. The opposition, led by Laurent Gbagbo and his Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI) thus protested when Houphouët wanted to maintain the right to vote for African 
immigrants, whereas neither non-African immigrants nor Ivorians residing abroad, 
two groups expected to be critical of the ruling party, were given the same right. 
Political debates now increasingly came to center on questions of origin and the 
relationship between “Ivorians by birth” and “foreigners”.  
When President Bédié faced declining support, he introduced the concept of Ivoirité, 
or “Ivoirianness”, to enhance a sense of pride in being Ivorian. This was used as a 
tool for further stigmatization of foreign groups, and increasingly also of Ivoirians of 
the Northern part of the country, who largely belong to the same population and 
language groups as immigrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. 
Before the presidential elections in 1995, a law was passed that prevented people who 
were not “pure-blood” Ivoirians to stand for election. This was interpreted as a move 
to exclude Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the leader of the Rassemblement de 
Républicains (RDR), to stand for president. The RDR had been created after a split in 
the ruling party following the death of Houphouët, and had become the biggest 
opposition party. Ouattara’s supporters now started mobilizing people of the North by 
claiming that Ouattara had been excluded because he was a northerner and a Muslim, 
adding further to inter-group tensions. 
Before the elections in 1995, the two main opposition parties, the RDR and the FPI, 
launched an “Active Boycott” and refused to pose candidates for the presidency, 
leaving Bédié as the only realistic candidate. In December 1999 Bédié was 
overthrown in a military coup d’état. This coup brought General Robert Gueï, former 
chief of the armed forces, to power for a transition period. In the subsequent elections 
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 in October 2000, Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI was elected, although General Gueï 
himself tried to capture the power by interrupting the counting of votes and 
announcing himself as victor. Mass demonstrations and unrest resulted in the 
appointment of Gbagbo as president, in accordance with the election result. However, 
like in 1995, the election had been boycotted by two of the major parties, this time by 
the PDCI and the RDR, and the voter turnout was only 56 percent (Crook 1997:235). 
Two years later, the FPI government was attacked by what later became known as 
“the rebellion”, and the country was thrown into civil war.  
In the course of the past two decades, Côte d’Ivoire has thus moved from an 
economic prosperity and political stability remarkable in an African context, towards 
increasing political tension and social protest and to the present-day warlike situation. 
1.2 Economic Crisis and IFI reform policies 
In the early 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire, like most other African countries, faced severe 
economic crisis with growing budget deficits and mounting foreign debts. The crisis 
was the combined result of a dramatic fall in world prices on primary commodities, 
growing interest rates on loans, and a strengthened dollar. Structural Adjustment 
programs, designed to reduce budget deficits and restore growth, were implemented 
at the initiative of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), notably the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 38 African governments signed some 
244 stabilization or adjustment loans with the World Bank and the IMF between 1980 
and 1989 (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:132). Questions of the ability of the 
adjustment programs to create sustainable economic growth, to reduce poverty, and 
to promote social development have been at the core of the development debate since 
the introduction of the programs. There have also been heated debates on the 
programs’ effects on the relationships between debtor and creditor countries. In this 
thesis we look at what happens on the national level in a country undergoing 
adjustment. In what ways have structural adjustment policies influenced internal 
national political dynamics and political stability? Are democracy, legitimacy, and 
the accountability of political authorities strengthened or threatened by the adjustment 
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 programs? While this study does not aspire to answer these questions, it is hoped that 
by examining central developments in Côte d’Ivoire following the reforms, it will be 
possible to shed some light on possible political consequences of economic reform.  
The programs were aimed at restoring growth, and focused on improving the balance 
of payments, liberalizing trade, and reducing the role of the state in the economy 
(World Bank 1994).  Devaluation of currencies, the removal of tariffs and subsidies, 
encouragement of export production, privatization of public enterprises, and public 
sector reforms were among the major policy measures (ibid.). From the World Bank’s 
perspective, the reforms represented a shift from a developmental paradigm focused 
on state-led industrialization to an economic model relying on market mechanisms 
and on export promotion as the engine of growth (ibid).  
Although the term structural adjustment is no longer used to describe current 
programs, the policies from the adjustment period is still carried on, though from the 
1990s there has been a heavier emphasis on social development and on governance 
issues. From 1999 many African countries have signed so-called Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with the World Bank and the IMF.3 These programs are 
directly oriented towards poverty reduction and aim at participatory processes in the 
countries concerned. The fundamental policy orientations of previous programs have, 
however, not been challenged, and critics have largely seen the PRSPs as a 
continuation of the structural adjustment policies. The debate on structural adjustment 
is thus still highly relevant both because of continued policies and because the effects 
of earlier policies are important to understand today’s economic and political 
developments. 
Côte d’Ivoire introduced its first structural adjustment program in 1981, and 
economic austerity became harsher towards the end of the 1980s, in response to 
deteriorating terms of trade and growing budget deficits. Main adjustment policies 
 
3 In Côte d’Ivoire a PRSP program was presented in September 2002, only weeks before the military mutiny. The process 
has since been stalled because of the political crisis. 
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 included public spending austerity measures, strict monetary policies to limit 
inflation, as well as rationalization of the industrial, agricultural, and energy sectors 
(Schneider 1991:27f). It was, however, towards the end of the 1980s and into the 
1990s that the consequences of adjustment became visible to the public and that 
structural adjustment became a major political issue in the country. As economic 
austerity measures became harsher, including major salary reductions and 
controversial privatizations, public protest against them grew. These protests became 
an important factor in the mobilization against the single party regime that finally led 
to the announcement of multiparty elections in May 1990. In October 1990 President 
Houphouët-Boigny appointed the former IMF official Alassane Ouattara to the new 
post of prime minister, to further economic reform. The severe economic reform 
measures that he became responsible for, as well as harsh repression of the 
opposition, contributed to vehement protests by the opposition, with the FPI and 
Gbagbo in front.  
Although many have studied the economic adjustment process in Côte d’Ivoire, few 
have looked directly at its impact on political contestation and conflict. In light of the 
current crisis these questions have gained new relevance. This thesis hence addresses 
the political dimension of the adjustment process in order to deepen our 
understanding of political tensions which have made possible a development from 
stability to breakdown. There are two main reasons for focusing on the political 
effects of economic reforms.  
First, economic reform is an aspect of the development of conflict that has been given 
relatively little attention in the debates on the Ivorian crisis (Campbell 2003:1f). 
Although there are several other more visible aspects of the crisis, in order to get a 
deeper understanding of the crisis it is crucial to explore the underlying social 
conflicts. As will be shown below, social conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1990s have 
been intimately related to economic change and reform.  
Second, the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions and their Structural Adjustment 
Programs has been at the core of debates on development in Africa since their 
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 introduction in the early 1980s. However, these debates tend to focus the economic 
and social effects of the programs, whereas relatively less attention has been given to 
their potential political effects. African scholars have, however, often given more 
importance to political aspects of adjustment, such as the effects of adjustment on 
democratization, political legitimacy, and social conflict (See for example Olukoshi 
1998, Mkandawire 1999). Côte d’Ivoire provides an example of an African country 
that has been undergoing far-reaching adjustment leading to major changes in the 
country’s political economy. At the same time the country has recently experienced a 
dramatic political breakdown. The case of Côte d’Ivoire thus offers an opportunity to 
explore possible links between adjustment and political crisis. By exploring 
relationships between adjustment and crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the study will contribute 
to the political aspect of the adjustment debate.  
1.3 Focus and Starting Point: Ethnic Strives or Contentious Action? 
The core explanation often highlighted for the growing political problems in Côte 
d’Ivoire is the use of identity manipulation by the elites, i.e. the political elites’ use of 
concepts such as citizenship, ethnicity and religion for personal political gains. Others 
highlight that ethnic antagonisms in themselves provoked political conflicts that 
destabilized political processes. This thesis starts from the assumption that neither 
demographic or cultural changes nor changes in elite strategies can be studied in 
isolation from the economic changes that occurred in parallel in the country. Instead 
of solely studying elite strategies, we will in addition focus on the people. Moreover, 
rather than focusing predominantly on demographic variables, we will address 
developments in economic conditions, poverty, and the distribution of resources as 
possible additional explanations of breakdown.  
From the early to mid-1990s, political debate in Côte d’Ivoire has increasingly 
focused on questions of identity and nationality. As a result, dichotomies such as 
“Ivorians versus immigrants”, “northerners versus southerners”, and “Christians 
versus Muslims” have developed, leading to the interpretation that the conflict is 
based on antagonisms caused by ethnic identity. Theoretical discussions on ethnic 
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 conflict often evolve around the difference between primordialists, who see ethnic 
identity as fundamental, and subsequently a source of conflict between groups, and 
instrumentalists, who regard ethnic conflict rather as a result of ethnic manipulation 
by elites. Instrumentalist approaches fit well into common interpretations of the 
Ivorian conflict, where Bédié’s concept of “Ivoirité” and Gbagbo’s exclusionist 
notions of citizenship is put forward as causes of the political breakdown. This 
theoretical distinction is applied in the discussion of the conflict. Further, in 
approaching the conflict from an economical point of view, we will also investigate 
how ethnic conflict may be related to economic changes and policies.   
The focus in this study is on political protest and violence as a consequence of 
breakdown in the political legitimacy of the government and the political system. The 
growing protests against the regime can be analyzed as contentious action, 
developing in a situation of declining legitimacy. According to Sidney Tarrow, 
contentious politics “occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more 
influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and 
opponents” (Tarrow 2003:2). Further, contentious politics emerges in response to 
changes in political opportunities and constraints (ibid). In that sense, not only 
changes in economic conditions (“grievance”), but likewise “opportunity” changes 
such as weakening of the government, divisions of the elites, and increasing presence 
of international financial institutions in Côte d’Ivoire during the 1980s and 1990s 
may have favored the rise of contention.  
Contentious action as a response to changes in economic conditions can be analyzed 
with the help of relative deprivation theories. These regard political violence as a 
response to a discrepancy between people’s material expectations and the 
opportunities they have to fulfill these expectations in reality. Economic changes do 
influence politics, but not in a deterministic or mechanical way. We hence need to 
study actual economic conditions, people’s perception of these as well as their ability 
to organize and put forward their demands. In addition to looking at aggregate 
numbers of economic developments and poverty, we look at how economic changes 
affected different groups, and how these groups responded politically.  
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 To sum up, we see the political breakdown as a result of a decline in the legitimacy of 
the rulers and the political system, which in turn manifested itself in increasing 
political protest. The aim of the study is to explore the reasons for the legitimacy 
crisis. Three theoretical perspectives are employed to shed light on the decline in 
legitimacy. First, different perspectives on ethnicity are discussed. In addition to the 
“classical” primordialist and instrumentalist approaches, perspectives that go further 
in placing ethnic identity in a socio-economical and political context are applied. 
These include theories on the neo-patrimonial state, which highlight the 
simultaneously integrating and disintegrating functions of economic distribution 
according to ethnic and other informal relations, and what happens when traditional 
distribution patterns are threatened by economic crisis. Second, we employ relative 
deprivation theories to explore the role of poverty and inequality in weakening 
legitimacy and spurring protest. Third, political accountability is discussed. This last 
point deals with the relations between the rulers and the ruled: To what extent and on 
what basis do leaders have to answer for their policies to the people? This is closely 
related to the role and capacity of political institutions. Finally, and moving to the 
core question of the study, we take a closer look at the economic changes that have 
been taking place, related to the economic crisis that hit the country in the 1980s and 
to the reforms introduced by the IFIs. Economic changes and reforms may have 
influenced the level of ethnic policies and distribution patterns as well as poverty and 
inequality and political accountability (see figure 1, p.10).  
The general question addressed in the study may be formulated simply as: What 
explains the political breakdown? The main focus, however, is on how the breakdown 
can be illuminated by economic developments and economic policies. In order to 
answer the second question, it is necessary to have an understanding of the first.  
Figure 1 is a visualization of the most important elements in the analysis and how 
they relate to each other. The figure should not be interpreted as a causal model; 
rather, the arrows in the model signalize that we want to discuss how one element 
influences the other. Below the figure it is shown how the different chapters deal with 
the different analytical elements.  
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Figure 1: Expected relations between economic change and breakdown  
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1.4 Methodological Approach: A Qualitative Case Study  
 
The study is conducted as a qualitative case study. The case study is defined by Yin 
(1994:13) as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. The phenomenon under study here is the political 
destabilization of Côte d’Ivoire. Since we look at developments leading to the 
rebellion in 2002, the study object is strictly speaking not contemporary. However, 
the recent character of the events, the complex character of the conflict, and the 
blurred boundaries between “phenomenon and context” make it fit for a case study. 
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 The study asks typical “how” and “why” questions (ibid:6) like “How does 
transformation from trust, legitimacy, and stability to political turmoil and civil war 
take place?” “Why do political leaders choose to rely on ethnic politics?”, and “How 
do the structural adjustment programs affect political trust and legitimacy?” 
 
The purpose of the study is to explain these developments. The case study is fit for 
this purpose because it makes it possible to employ a wide variety of evidence 
(documents, interviews, and observation) (Yin 1994:8) as well as to consider a wide 
range of variables (ibid:13) which is necessary to grasp such a complex phenomenon 
as that of the political destabilization of a country.  
1.4.1 Fieldwork  
The fieldwork was conducted from February 19 to March 30 2004 in Abidjan, 
preceded by a 10-day research stay at the CODESRIA Research Center in Dakar. It 
allowed me to access written information, conduct interviews, as well as to follow 
political events and debate over a period of time, thus giving me an understanding of 
the nature of the political crisis that would not have been possible without a stay of 
this duration.  
 
The short time (one and a half years) between the rebellion and the fieldwork means 
that people will remember well the events as well as how it was in the years before 
the rebellion. Of course the more the conversations go back in the history, the more 
will the informants’ accounts and analysis of events be colored by their experiences 
after the time in question. We must be aware, for example, that political militants’ 
account of the mobilization against the single party regime will be influenced by their 
position in today’s conflict.  
 
At the time of the fieldwork, the country was still divided in two between rebel- and 
government-controlled areas and was, at least officially, trying to implement the 
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 Marcoussis Accord4 from January 2003. Although the country was generally calm 
during the period, the conflict issues were far from finding any solution, and the 
political situation remained extremely tense. The fieldwork thus gave me the 
opportunity to look closely into an ongoing conflict. The data collected during the 
fieldwork consist of interviews as well as primary and secondary sources such as 
statistics on economic performance and living conditions, newspaper articles, books, 
and academic articles. There was also an element of direct observation, especially 
connected to the home and the neighborhood where I lived, in Yopougon, the most 
populous, working class quarter in Abidjan. I was able to observe how people’s lives 
were affected by the crisis and strategies they used to survive, as well as to listen to 
people’s reactions to everyday events and discussions of the political situation. My 
presence as a foreigner and a student naturally influenced these situations to a certain 
extent, but the people I stayed with got used to my presence and did not change their 
behavior significantly, as far as I could judge. Language barriers posed a problem to 
direct observation. Although my French works well for leading conversations and 
discussions, following a discussion among “native” French speakers is a different 
matter, especially when they use slang, local expressions, and sometimes mix their 
French with their local language5.  
 
Because of the security situation and time constraints, the fieldwork was limited to 
Abidjan. This is the administrative and economic center as well as the largest city, 
and where the great majority of relevant political actors and institutions as well as 
academics are found6. However, this gives the study a certain bias: While I had good 
access to people who had been active in the events in Abidjan, I did not have the 
chance to talk to people living in the northern Côte d’Ivoire, which is occupied by 
rebel movements. Neither did I have the chance to do interviews with people who had 
 
4 The French-brokered Marcoussis-accord  was signed by all the major political  parties, including  President Gbagbo of the 
FPI,  and by  the three rebel groups. It calls for the revision of the legislation about citizenship, extended eligibility for the 
presidency and for land reforms. It also prescribes the disarmament and the reunification of the country.    
5 Most people in Abidjan use French for everyday use as well as “official” matters. Most people have, however, an other 
language as their mother tongue, which they use among family and others who have the same language, often in a mix with 
French.  
6 the University of Bouaké, the second largest city, have transferred its activities to the Univiersity of Cocody, Abidjan, 
after the former city’s occupation by rebel movements 
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 been a part of the conflicts in the forest zone. Likewise, conversations about 
economic reforms focused on the effects in the cities and less on the consequences in 
rural areas. However, considering the importance of the forest zone conflicts, as well 
as the impact that economic reforms have had in rural areas, I have still chosen to 
include them in the analysis. The analysis of the land issue and conflicts in the forest 
zone is thus based primarily on secondary sources.  
 
Primary written sources consist of official documentation and statistics on economic 
developments, social developments, and structural adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
Secondary written sources that are addressed are, among others: analyses of the 
political developments in Côte d’Ivoire and of the political economy of Côte d’Ivoire, 
and other relevant historical accounts of the country. Further, literature on political 
crisis and civil war; economic reform; state- society relations in Africa; ethnicity and 
nationalism are addressed.  
 
Altogether 25 interviews were conducted. These include political actors, government 
officials, World Bank and IMF officials, researchers, and political commentators. The 
interviews are essential to access some critical information of events that are not yet 
well-documented in written sources and to confirm information from other sources, 
but above all they are useful for the thorough understanding of the political conflict 
and the argumentation used by the different parties in the conflict. The interviews are 
of a semi-structured type. An interview guide with 22 questions was prepared before 
the fieldwork, and worked as a “checklist” for me to know what questions I needed 
the informants to answer. However, I usually started out by asking quite open 
questions to give the informants the opportunity to elaborate on the issues that were 
important to them. Usually it was not necessary for me to ask all the questions, many 
of them were in fact answered before I had had the time to ask. In some instances I 
also gave priority to additional information that I could get from listening to what the 
informants wanted to talk about rather than to follow my guide strictly. Usually, 
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 however, I made sure to guide the conversation so that the major questions were 
answered.  
 
I used a minidisk recorder at about half of the interviews. This gave me the chance to 
concentrate upon the conversation, and I did not get the impression that it disturbed 
the informant. In fact, my impression was that note-taking was more disturbing to the 
conversation, as the informants were made conscious of what elements of their 
answers I wrote down. None of the informants that were interviewed with a recorder 
expressed surprise when I asked about recording. At one instance, however, I was 
asked not to record. At the other instances where the recorder was not used, it was to 
avoid interruptions in an ongoing conversation, as many interviews started as 
informal conversations and moved gradually into the subject of the interview. The 
recorded interviews are of better quality than the non-recorded ones, as nuances and 
details could be lost in note-taking.  
 
All the interviews were conducted in French. Although some of the informants would 
have been able to speak English, I chose to use French, as this is the official language 
and I considered it both most natural and most polite to address people in French. 
Although French is a foreign language to me, and I was not used to “West African” 
French, I found this to be a minor problem in the interview situation, where I was 
able to ask the informant to elaborate or explain if something was unclear. The quotes 
from interviews, as well as literature, in the text are all in my translation.  
 
One contact worked as a key informant during the fieldwork, and set up nearly half of 
my interview appointments. He was a crucial resource both in introducing me to the 
intricate political landscape of the country and in giving me access to other 
informants. It would hardly have been possible without him, for instance, to interview 
some of the most central people both in the New Forces (the rebellion) and in the 
patriotic movements (the militias). In some instances it was also necessary that he 
joined in the interviews. This, however, also helped create a friendly atmosphere, 
which profited the interview.  
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There are two major methodological problems with the use of the key informant. 
Firstly, he chose interview objects, which obviously gave him considerable power. 
However, he was open to my suggestions both of people and organizations, and to his 
best capacity helped me get in touch with those I wanted to meet. I also deliberately 
countered this influence by using other contacts. Secondly, I often discussed the 
interviews with him afterwards, opening the possibility that my impressions were 
colored by his opinions. In the cases where my key informant participated in the 
interviews, there is a possibility that his presence influenced the informant. Yet this 
could also be positive, as I sometimes could get valuable additional information by 
listening to discussions between the two.  
 
In the interviews with the representatives from the World Bank and the IMF as well 
as one civil servant, the Norwegian Embassy set up the appointment and an embassy 
representative was present at the interviews. My role as a student was, however, 
clear, and my impression is that the presence of the embassy did not influence the 
information significantly, although there is of course a possibility that the situation 
was influenced by the presence of a “third party”.  
1.4.2 Methodological limitations 
The role of economic policies in the evolution of conflict has been given relatively 
little attention, and the aim of this thesis is thus to explore the economic aspect of the 
development of conflict. This does not mean that we expect economic policies to be 
the single most important factor in explaining conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Neither will 
our analysis allow us to measure the effect of economic policies compared to other 
factors. Rather, it is an attempt at shedding light on one little discussed aspect of the 
crisis. One reason to regard economic factors as interesting in analyzing the conflict 
in Côte d’Ivoire is theoretical: On the basis of earlier research we assume changes in 
economic developments and policies to be essential to understand political change. 
What this analysis may allow us to do is therefore at best to strengthen our 
assumption of the relation between reform and conflict, by pointing to the 
mechanisms through which reforms have influenced conflict. It has thus been 
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 essential to address as many sources as possible that may show these mechanisms. 
Equally important, however, is to search actively for sources that contradict our 
assumptions, and then consider our other findings in the light of contradicting views 
(Yin 1994).  
While this thesis will shed light on the impact of economic developments, we do not 
intend to blame the IMF and the World Bank for the political breakdown. Economic 
reforms were needed in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s on the background of the country’s 
deep economic crisis, including a growing debt burden and subsequent budget 
deficits. Furthermore, the adjustment programs that governments agreed to are poor 
indicators of their ability, or willingness, to actually enter into reform (Bratton and 
van de Walle 1997). As such, the reactions often perceived to be in response to the 
economic reforms, may as well have been a consequence of the economic crisis itself. 
The thesis attempts, however, to examine how the strategies chosen to deal with the 
crisis related to the political realities and influenced them. Through this process, it is 
hoped that the thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the political aspects 
of adjustment.  
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 2. Background of Côte d’Ivoire 
The death of president Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 marked the end of a 
period of political stability exceptional in African post-colonial history. Not only had 
Côte d’Ivoire been ruled by the same president and the same party for 33 years, but 
political conflict and protest against the government had been kept at very low levels 
compared to many other African countries, even though this had begun to change 
towards the end of the 1980s. The recent political breakdown compels us to examine 
the characteristics of one-party rule in Côte d’Ivoire, of the opposition movement that 
emerged to challenge it, and of the democratic transition that started a few years 
before the death of the “Old Man”. Likewise, demographic and economic 
developments shed light on the political developments leading to crisis. This chapter 
starts by a brief account of political events from colonial times up to the coup d’état 
of 1999 (2.1). Chapter 2.3 and 2.4 present central demographic and economic 
developments, which are crucial to understanding the development of conflict in the 
1990s. Finally, Chapter 2.4 describes the development of nationalism and rising 
social tensions leading to breakdown.  
2.1 Political Background: From Colony to Multiparty System  
Côte d’Ivoire became a French colony in 1893, and hence a part of French West 
Africa. The French developed a plantation economy with the export of coffee, cocoa 
and other agricultural products. To meet the demand for labor, the system of forced 
labor was introduced, and a large-scale migration program from Upper Volta (present 
Burkina Faso) followed. The colonial power prioritized the economic development of 
Côte d’Ivoire, which had good natural conditions for agriculture especially in the 
Southern part, as well as access to the sea. Côte d’Ivoire thus continued to attract 
immigration from the dryer countries in the Sahel, even after independence.  
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the leader of the Ivorian African Planters Union, came to 
represent the French African colonies as Africans started to get a limited influence in 
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 colonial politics after World War II. He became the most influential African member 
of the French parliament, and even occupied ministerial posts. In 1946 he was the 
proponent of the bill that abolished forced labor in the colonies, an achievement that 
added to his popularity and status in Côte d’Ivoire and the rest of French West Africa. 
In 1958, under de Gaulle’s leadership, the French Community was established, in 
which the colonies obtained greater internal autonomy. Referenda were organized in 
the colonies to choose between membership in the Community and total 
independence, and Guinea was the only colony to refuse de Gaulle’s Community, 
thus becoming the first French colony to become formally independent. Houphouët-
Boigny stood forth as a key proponent for the Community, and clearly preferred this 
structure to total independence (Zolberg:233ff; Siriex:188ff). But with Ghana’s 
independence in 1957 and Guinea following in 1958, the move towards independence 
was inevitable. Côte d’Ivoire thus became an independent republic on August 7, 
1960.  
The period from 1945 to independence had seen the development of various political 
parties and interest organizations and growing political competition in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Already before independence, however, the trend towards growing competition was 
reversed and the power was increasingly concentrated around one party, the Parti 
Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) of Houphouët-Boigny. In the April 1959 
elections, 100 candidates stood for the 100 seats, all on the PDCI list (Amundsen 
1997: 306). Helped by the electoral system and the already established position of the 
party’s leader as representative to the French Legislative Assembly, the PDCI also 
led a deliberate coalition-building strategy across ethnic and regional cleavages. The 
party managed to attract upcoming cadres, because they increasingly controlled 
access to positions and resources (ibid:310).  
Maintaining close ties with the former colonial power was a major priority for the 
independent Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët, and French private investment and 
technical cooperation in the public sector was encouraged (Mundt 1995:14). The 
economic structure from the colonial period was maintained, prioritizing the 
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 agricultural sector. The export of cocoa, coffee, and timber provided the pillars of the 
economy and the basis for economic growth. Côte d’Ivoire was also a privileged 
partner by France, as shown by the term “la vitrine de la France en Afrique” 
(“France’s showcase in Africa”) and illustrated for example by the fact that the 
country even in 2003 received 22% of France’s total official aid (OECD 2005). 
Compared to other former French colonies, Côte d’Ivoire has had a great number of 
French nationals residing in the country, and French capital has dominated the 
industrial sector.  
2.1.1 The “Houphouët-Boigny System” 
The Houphouët presidency, lasting from independence in 1960 to Houphouët’s death 
in December 1993, can be interpreted as a process of consolidation of the power of 
the PDCI, and perhaps even more, of the president himself. The political system of 
Côte d’Ivoire was a system of personal rule. The president built up a political 
leadership consisting largely of people without a political history, who were not well 
known in their regions. These people thus had no home constituencies, and “owed 
everything to the one who gave them power” (Bakary 1984:37f). Furthermore, 
political opposition was often met by offers of political positions to potential rivals.  
Two alleged coup attempts, in 1963 and 1964, resulted in the exclusion of more 
radically oriented leaders within the party, including the presidents of the National 
Assembly and the Supreme Court (Amundsen 1997:313). When students, joined by 
other groups, organized demonstrations in 1968 and 1969 in line with student 
demonstrations in European cities at the time, a combination of repressive means, 
including massive arrests and the closing of the University, and a Public Dialogue 
were used to silence the protests (ibid). According to Inge Amundsen, events like 
these should not be understood as signs of instability, but rather in terms of 
authoritarian stabilization, because of their effect of consolidating the power of the 
party and the president (ibid:312). Towards the end of the 1970s extensive corruption 
in the state administration came to the fore, and Houphouët answered by firing three 
of his ministers in 1977, including the Minister of Finance, Henri Konan Bédié.  
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 2.1.2 Growing protests and demands for multiparty elections 
Although the position of Houphouët-Boigny as a president was never close to being 
threatened, events in the last years of his presidency showed a weakening of his grip 
on the Ivorian society. During the 1980s, discontent at the level of student 
movements and trade unions rose. In September 1989 President Houphouët, as a 
response to growing hardships and criticism of his government, called for a National 
Dialogue where representatives form different social groups were invited to bring 
forward their views on the current situation in the country. Participants raised the 
issues of economic crisis, reduced purchasing power, and unemployment, as well as 
governance problems of corruption and fraud, and stressed the impact of the crisis on 
the lives of Ivorians (N’Da 1999:61). The crisis was attributed partly to external 
economic factors like deteriorating terms of trade, but also to a slow-working 
administrative apparatus and to the system of one-party rule.  
The National Dialogue was a strategic move from a president who needed to gather 
support for his government’s policies in a pressed situation where he was planning 
severe budget cuts due to both growing budget deficits and IMF and World Bank 
pressures (Woods 1998:225). He did not, however, manage to gather all the 
participants around the government policies as he had hoped for, due to the protests 
of the university teachers’ union SYNARES. They linked the country’s growing 
economic problems to the one-party political system, and became the first political 
organization to advocate openly for the transition to multiparty government, when it 
called for the application of Article 7 of the Constitution.7 The president and the party 
rejected the claims, and SYNARES was put under close scrutiny (N’Da 1999:62). 
Shortly after the National Dialogue, Houphouët-Boigny announced several dramatic 
measures, including a halving of the prices paid to coffee and cocoa producers, public 
sector reform involving major staff reductions, accelerated privatization of public 
sector firms, and salary cuts for public and private sector employees. These economic 
policies represented a major shift in Ivorian post-independence politics. For example, 
 
7 This is an article that permits different parties to compete for political power, and which had not been practiced in the 
country’s 29 year-old history as an independent country. 
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 the halving of the coffee and cocoa prices was the first change in these prices in 
twenty years. 
The first months of 1990 were marked by strikes, students’ protests and social unrest, 
directed towards wage cuts, deteriorating conditions on campus, and towards the one-
party system. On February 19, students at the University of Abidjan started a student 
strike demanding the resignation of the Minister of Education, who subsequently had 
to go (N’Da 1999:64). More and more of the trade unions defied their old affiliations 
with the PDCI and joined the protests (ibid.) On March 2, the schools and universities 
were closed, and a “blank year” announced. March and April saw more unions 
joining the demonstrations, growing critique of corruption and personal enrichment 
on the part of PDCI leaders, as well as increasing calls for multiparty elections. On 
May 3, opposition parties and independent organizations were legalized, and the first 
multiparty election after independence announced to be held in October.   
Although the opposition claimed that the elections in October 1990 were marked by 
irregularities, there is little doubt that president Houphouët was re-elected by the 
consent of the majority of the people. The “Father of the nation” took home 82 
percent of the vote, whereas the major opposition candidate, Laurent Gbagbo of the 
Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) got 18 percent. In the following legislative and 
municipal elections the PDCI also won by large majorities.  
The years following the first multiparty elections were characterized by growing 
student mobilization and violent clashes between students and the police. The 
organization FESCI, formed in June 1991 as a federation of several student 
organizations, opposed the removal of scholarships, housing, and free transportation 
for students, and worsening conditions on campus. Demonstrations and gatherings 
were violently suppressed, as in the event at the Yopougon Student Residence in May 
1991, where numerous students were reported to be injured and raped, and others 
disappeared, after army units invaded the students’ dormitories the night after a 
student meeting.   
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 February 18, 1992, a joint march by the opposition parties and organizations like the 
Human Rights League LIDHO, SYNARES, and FESCI ended with the arrest of 146 
persons, among them FPI leader and member of parliament Laurent Gbagbo (N’Da 
1999:87). This massive arrest was made possible by a new severe law passed by the 
Ouattara government, which made the organizers of the demonstrations liable for 
anything that happened during the demonstration (Crook 1997:223f).  
The FESCI and the SYNARES, created as interest organizations to fight for the living 
conditions of their respective groups, both became politicized and came to see 
themselves as a part of the wider democratic movement. Gradually this movement 
put their support behind the biggest opposition party, the FPI, and its leader, the 
history teacher Laurent Gbagbo.  
2.1.3 The death of Houphouët-Boigny and the succession struggle 
The question of who would succeed Houphouët-Boigny as president had been a 
source of debate and personal struggles within the PDCI almost throughout his 
presidency. Before his death, however, Houphouët made a constitutional change that 
made the president of the national assembly the successor to the presidency in case of 
the president’s death. This person would hold the office until the year of the next 
election8. This constitutional change was Houphouët’s way of “appointing” Henri 
Konan Bédié, president of the National Assembly since 1980, as his successor.  
When the death of Houphouët-Boigny was announced on December 7, 1993, 
however, the Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara tried to announce himself as 
the new president. Ouattara, an economist and former IMF official and head of the 
West African Central Bank (BCEAO) had been called to Côte d’Ivoire in the 
turbulent spring months of 1990 as a government advisor to reform the country’s ill-
managed economy. He was then appointed to the newly created post of Prime 
Minister in October 1990, and became the person who took on the offices of the 
president when the latter came to spend increasingly longer hospital stays in France. 
 
8Until then the Constitution had prescribed the organizing of new elections within 60 days 
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 But Bédié won the short succession struggle, and Ouattara soon after took up the post 
as Deputy Managing Director at the IMF in Washington.  
However, Ouattara had strong supporters within the PDCI, and a conflict emerged 
within the party between the “old guard” of party loyalists, centered on Bédié, and a 
new group of younger technocrats with liberal economic views, supporting the 
candidacy of Ouattara. In July 1994 this group broke away from the PDCI and 
created the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) to support the candidacy of 
Ouattara for the presidential elections of October 1995. Ouattara was, however, 
prevented from posing his candidacy, on the grounds that he was not Ivorian. In mid-
1994, the government proposed a new Electoral Law that not only deprived 
foreigners of the right to vote that they had enjoyed under Houphouët, but also 
restricted the right to stand as candidate for the Presidency to persons who were 
Ivorians by birth, with both parents also being Ivoirans by birth. Furthermore, 
candidates should have resided continuously in the country for the five years prior to 
the elections, and should neither have renounced their Ivorian citizenship nor taken 
the nationality of another state (Crook 1997:228). Ouattara was not only said to have 
a father from Burkina Faso, he had stayed abroad during the last five years, and 
furthermore, during his time in the IMF and the West African Central Bank had 
traveled on a Burkinabè diplomatic passport.  
The intellectual justification for these changes in legislation lay in the introduction of 
the concept of “Ivoirité”, developed at the University of Abidjan and introduced by 
Bédié in response to the political challenge from the RDR. The term was meant to 
enhance a sense of pride in being Ivorian, and despite Bédié’s assurances that it was 
not a break with the traditional Ivorian hospitality from the Houphouët days, had the 
result of arising and intensifying hostility against the country’s many foreigners, and 
progressively also against “northerners” of Côte d’Ivoire.  
The changes in the Electoral Law were considered discriminating by the opposition, 
who also protested other injustices in the planned election. During the months leading 
up to the election, the FPI of Laurent Gbagbo and the RDR of Alassane Ouattara 
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 joined forces and formed the Front Républicain, which claimed several dramatic 
reforms in the Electoral Law and the organizing of the elections. Not satisfied with 
the reforms proposed, they decided to boycott the elections. The boycott was called 
the Active Boycott and involved mobilizing party militants to try to actively sabotage 
the elections (Crook 1997:233). Bédié thus won the elections with 96,5 percent, only 
challenged at the polls by the minor Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), the Ivorian 
Workers’ Party.  
Bédié and the PDCI seemed to have strengthened their position in the Elections of 
1995, and in the following months few observers believed in any power shift in the 
near future. After the elections, however, the RDR started to use the changes in the 
Electoral Law in their campaigning, and increasingly tried to mobilize residents of 
Northern Côte d’Ivoire by claiming that the ruling party deliberately discriminated 
Northerners and Muslims on ethnic and religious grounds (Crook 1997:234). The 
rupture of the PDCI has been said to break a historical alliance from the Houphouët 
days between on the one hand the Baoulé9 ethnic group in the south, and on the other 
hand the people of Northern Côte d’Ivoire and immigrants from Burkina Faso and 
Mali, often belonging to the same ethnic groups as Ivoiran “northerners”10, thus 
depriving Bédié of a big part of his party’s traditional constituency.   
2.2 Demographic Developments and Ethnic Structure 
Côte d’Ivoire’s large immigrant population comes from neighboring countries such as 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, and to a lesser extent Senegal, Mauritania, and 
Ghana. Immigrants were attracted by the relatively prosperous economy and the 
possibility for work at plantations, and they soon came to provide the bulk of the 
labor force in the plantation economy. Côte d’Ivoire’s choice of opening the 
country’s borders to immigration has resulted in a population which counted over 
26% foreigners in 1998, the rate having increased steadily from only 5% in 1950 
(Serhan 2002:173). This figure is remarkably high by African and international 
 
9 Both Houhouët-Boigny  and Bédié belong to the Baoulé group  
10 Senoufo, Malinké, Mande and Voltaic 
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 standards, and the country has been widely admired for managing to receive so many 
immigrants and at the same time avoiding conflict between different nationalities. 
Although immigration has continued well into the 1990s, a large number of those 
who comprise the “foreigners” category today are born in the country, some of them 
having parents who are also born there. Having the nationality of their origin, has, 
however, been the natural choice for most in this group, and has caused few problems 
until the beginning of the 1990s, when the right to vote was restricted to Ivorian 
nationals, and the introduction of the “carte de séjour”11 brought the distinction 
between Ivorians and foreigners to the fore of the political scene.  
The population of Côte d’Ivoire in 2003 was 17.6 million, of which 45% lived in 
cities (UNDP 2005). The country is comprised of more than sixty ethnic groups, 
which can be grouped into five main language groups: Akan, Mande, Krou, Voltaic, 
and Lagoon. Figures from 1995 estimated that 23 percent of the population belonged 
to the Baoulé group, 18 percent to Bété, 15 percent to Senoufo, and 33 percent to 
other groups. The Akan peoples, who include the Baoulé, are largely located in the 
central region and along the eastern coast, as well as in neighboring Ghana and Togo. 
The Mande can be divided into northern Mande (including Dioula and Malinké) and 
the southern Mande. Originally from Liberia, Guinea, and Mali, most of them are 
located in the centre-west of the country. Krou speakers, including several the Bété 
group, live mainly in the west. Along the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali in the 
north is the Voltaic group, to which the Senoufo belongs. Finally, the Lagoon people 
live close to the coastal lagoon and the coast. 
Many of the immigrants who have come to Côte d’Ivoire from neighboring countries 
share their ethnic affiliation and language with Ivorians; many of the Malian and 
Burkinabè immigrants, for example, belong to the Mande or Voltaic groups. The 
three major religious traditions are traditional African religions, Islam and 
Christianity, of which Islam is estimated to be the religion of 25 percent of the 
population and Christianity of 17 percent. Traditionally, Islam is a major religion 
 
11 “Residence permit” that distinguishes the immigrants from Ivoirian citizens. It has been used as a negative identification 
mark provoking stigmatization and  
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 among the Mande and Voltaic groups, whereas Christianity has followers among the 
Akan and Lagoon peoples.  
Politics in Côte d’Ivoire has sometimes been said to be dominated by the largest 
ethnic group, the Baoulé, to which both Houphouët-Boigny and his successor Henri 
Konan Bédié belong. However, one of the major achievements of Houphouët after 
Independence was to include people of different ethnic, geographic, and religious 
affiliations in his new elite, thus securing his support from different population 
groups. Especially the immigrant population has traditionally been loyal to the 
president and his party, the PDCI. With the breakaway of the RDR from the PDCI, 
and the introduction of the “Ivoirité” discourse during the Bédié presidency, this 
loyalty has, however, been threatened. The current president, Laurent Gbagbo, is a 
Bété, and although the FPI, like all parties, recruit followers from all ethnic groups, 
the Bété has formed an important part of his constituency.  
2.3 Economic Structure and Economic Developments 
Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s leading producer of cocoa and ranks fifth in global coffee 
production. In 1998 cocoa beans exports accounted for 29% of the country’s exports, 
while processed cocoa represented 7%, coffee beans 8% and petroleum products 10% 
(INS 1999:8) A majority of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports go to Western Europe (51.4% in 
1998), with France being the biggest country destination. The second geographical 
region for Ivorian exports is West Africa (ibid:4). Côte d’Ivoire imports both 
industrial products and food, and electric machines and constructions represented 16 
percent of the country’s imports in 1998, while wheat, rice, and meat represented 7 
percent. In 1998 Côte d’Ivoire received 56 percent of its imports from Western 
Europe, with 29 percent coming from France alone. While the balance of trade varied 
considerably between 1974 and 1998, it remained positive throughout the period. In 
relation to its major trading partners, however, France and Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire 
experienced trade deficits in bilateral trade between 1992 and 1998.  
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 While agriculture and cash crop production has been a major priority for the Ivorian 
government, the country has also tried to build up an industrial base through an 
import substitution strategy. The major industrial fields are agricultural processing, 
energy, and construction, textile manufacturing and the apparel industry. From 1965 
to 1975, industry’s share of exports earnings rose from 20 to 35 percent (Library of 
Congress 2005). Import substitution policies faced difficulties, however, as the 
emergence of a domestic market was hindered by low wages in the agricultural 
sector, which comprised the largest segment of the labor force (ibid).  
From 1965 to 1975 Côte d’Ivoire had an annual average growth of 8% of GDP 
(Husain and Faruqee 1994:81). From the mid-70s, ambitious investment programs 
following a price boom for cocoa and coffee in 1976 left the country with heavy 
foreign debts (ibid). These debts became hard to serve as coffee and cocoa prices 
started falling, while at the same time Côte d’Ivoire as an oil importing country 
suffered from rising oil prices related to the first and second oil shocks. The country’s 
terms of trade thus declined by roughly 40 percent from 1978-1982 (Zartman and 
Delgado 1984:15). Commercial interest rates rose in the same period. The country 
then entered a severe economic crisis, and in 1981 it turned to the IMF and the World 
Bank for assistance, starting the period of economic adjustment.  
2.4 The rise of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics  
There is wide agreement that the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire is intimately linked 
to the country’s history of immigration and to the ways in which the country’s 
demographic composition has been managed by the political elite. While immigration 
from other African countries was encouraged in the 1960s and 1970s, it seems like 
the large group of first, second and third generation immigrants in the country today 
are used as scapegoats for the economic and political problems. Many analysts claim 
that these groups have never been fully integrated into Ivorian society, and that the 
tensions we see today are the consequence of the lack of integration.  
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 2.4.1 Multiparty elections and the question of citizenship 
In 1966, the Parliament stopped a proposition from President Houphouët-Boigny to 
grant double citizenship to foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire. However, foreigners did 
have the right to vote in elections. During the period of single-party rule, where there 
were no real opponents to Houphouët in presidential elections, the foreigners’ vote 
was accepted and seen as “a civic thank-offering by the immigrants to Houphouët-
Boigny for his hospitality” (Crook 1997:222). With the introduction of multiparty 
elections, however, the issues of citizenship and the right to vote gained new 
importance, and the foreigners’ voting right became controversial.  
 
Through his “policy of hospitality”, Houphouët-Boigny had not only provided the 
country with plentiful labor in the agricultural and industrial sectors, securing the 
basis for rapid economic growth (cf. Chapter 2), he had also secured himself a 
constituency of people who felt personally indebted to him. The relations between 
immigrant groups and the political elite also included close links between 
organizations representing various migrant groups, e.g. Burkinabè and Malian, on the 
one hand and local and national authorities on the other (Chauveau 2000:10).  
 
When prior to the multiparty elections in October 1990 it was announced that African 
foreigners would be allowed to vote, the opposition therefore interpreted this as 
deliberate election rigging to secure the victory of the PDCI, especially since neither 
non-African foreigners nor Ivorians abroad were allowed to vote. The opposition, led 
by the FPI, chose to challenge the ruling party by countering its alliance with the 
foreigners. This was done through attacking non-democratic and corrupt practices by 
the PDCI, but increasingly also by portraying “the foreigners” as a group that was 
being unjustly favored by the political elite to the detriment of “real” Ivorians. The 
FPI thus started to encourage an Ivorian xenophobic nationalism.  
 
In the following years the question of citizenship became an increasingly important 
issue in Ivorian politics. Political debate came to center around the criteria for being 
defined as an Ivorian and thus being granted citizenship, a National Identity Card, 
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 and the right to vote; and around the question of eligibility for the presidency. The 
new focus on citizenship and a hardened tone towards foreigners was accompanied 
by a new nationalist rhetoric encouraged by Henri Konan Bédié’s term Ivoirité.  
2.4.2 The Ivoirité discourse  
In December 1993 Houphouët-Boigny died. His appointed successor, Henri Konan 
Bédié, soon faced the splitting of his party, when some deputies and technocrats 
within the PDCI who had wanted Alassane Ouattara for president broke away and 
formed the RDR in early 1994. Within the following months political debate in Côte 
d’Ivoire became dominated by an increasingly tense power struggle between the 
leaders of the three major parties, Bédié, Gbagbo, and Ouattara, and by rhetoric of 
ethnicity and xenophobia.  
 
Bédié launched the term Ivoirité as an attempt to mobilize a sense of national pride 
and unity. It was also an attempt to save the position of the PDCI in face of the 
challenge from the RDR. The Ivoirité discourse has been regarded by observers as the 
root cause of the problems today ravaging Côte d’Ivoire. The initiation of this 
discourse by the political elite clearly led to a gradual aggravation of xenophobia and 
an “ethnicization” of the political debate, where foreigners were increasingly being 
used as scapegoats for the country’s economic and political problems. The ethno-
sociologist Georges Niangoran Bouah defines the socio-cultural foundations of 
Ivoirité as follows:  
 
“Ivoirité is the set of socio-historical, geographic, and linguistic data which enables 
us to say that an individual is a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire or an Ivorian. The person 
who asserts his ‘Ivoirité’ is supposed to have Côte d’Ivoire as his country, be born of 
Ivorian parents belonging to one of the ethnic groups native to Côte d’Ivoire.” 
   (Georges Niangoran Bouah 1996, quoted in Akindès 2004:27) 
 
The ideological justification of Ivoirité was developed by scholars of the University 
of Codody, Abidjan, under the unit CURDIPHE (University Cell for the Research 
and Diffusion of the Political Ideas and Actions of Henri Konan Bédié). The group 
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 was formed at the PDCI annual congress in august 1995, where Bédié for the first 
time presented the idea of Ivoirité officially. A year later CURDIPHE published its 
manifesto “Ivoirité, or the Spirit of President Henri Konan Bédié’s New Social 
Contract”. In this document, the high proportion of immigrants in the country was 
raised as a major cause of concern, particularly because of the “dominant” or 
“hegemonic” place they were said to have in the economy. The manifesto also 
stressed the need to define clearly who was an Ivorian and who was not:  
 
“In order to construct a “We”, you have to distinguish a “They”. We need to manage 
to establish the discrimination WE/THEY in a way that is compatible with pluralism 
of nationalities”  
(CURDIPHE 2000:66)  
 
In 1998, the Economic and Social Council published a report entitled “Immigration 
in Côte d’Ivoire: the Limit of Tolerance is passed” (Immigration en Côte d’Ivoire: le 
seuil du tolérable est largement dépassé”). The report warned against the negative 
consequences of the large-scale immigration into Côte d’Ivoire, and painted a picture 
where foreigners were said to be dominating the economy and to a large extent made 
responsible for the growth in poverty among Ivorians. The report also said that the 
large influx of Muslim immigrants had “considerably modified the pre-existing 
religious balance”, and warned that this “could lead some people to endeavor to 
exploit religious affiliation for political ends, which is a disservice to national 
harmony and unity, and a threat to the social peace so dear to our country” (Report of 
the Economic and Social Council, October 1998, cited in Akindès 2004:29).  
 
According to Akindès, Ivoirité existed in two versions: a “tribal” version during the 
Bédié presidency and a more “civic” version after the transition under General Gueï. 
The tribal version of Ivoirité tended to safeguard the position of the Akan ethnic 
group, which was seen to have a “predisposition to govern others”, but under 
democratization was losing the dominant political position that they had been 
preserving for four decades. In his book “Les chemins de ma vie”, Bédié describes 
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 the history of the Akan people. According to him, Akan tradition and thought systems 
were rich enough to serve as a motor for rapid modernization of Côte d’Ivoire. 
According to Akindès, Bédié followed the tradition from Houphouët’s time in trying 
to preserve Akan hegemony. The break with Houphouëtism, however, consisted of 
making this strategy explicit, thus introducing an identity dimension into political 
debate.  
 
In the second version, Ivoirité was less Akan and more inclusive to people of the 
south, center, and west, but still exclusive towards people of the north. Because 
people of the north, like Senoufo and Malinké, often share family names with the 
citizens of neighboring countries, and also share their Muslim religion, they tend to 
be regarded by southerners as less than full members of the Ivorian nation (Akindès 
2004:29). 
2.4.3 The electoral code and restrictions on eligibility   
The “intellectual” work on Ivoirité and the increasingly nationalist language used by 
the president and the political elite worked as the justification for radical changes in 
policy. In December 1994, the national assembly passed a new electoral code. It 
restricted the right to vote to Ivorian citizens, and stated that candidates for the 
presidency must be Ivorians by birth, with both parents also being Ivorians by birth. 
In addition, candidates should not have been living outside the country for the last 
five years, and should never have renounced their Ivorian citizenship or taken the 
nationality of another state (Crook 1997: 228).  
 
The restrictions on eligibility were quite clearly designed to prevent Alassane 
Ouattara form presenting himself as a presidential candidate. Ouattara’s nationality 
was disputed; his opponents claimed his father was Burkinabè, while Ouattara 
himself has always maintained he is 100 percent Ivorian. At the time, Ouattara was 
also living in the United States, and he was criticized for having traveled on a 
Burkinabè passport in the past (actually a Burkinabè diplomatic passport).  
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 The PDCI, in proposing these changes in legislation, was using to its advantage the 
FPI’s protests against the elections four years before. The FPI, who had been 
campaigning to remove the foreigners’ right to vote in 1990, could hardly protest 
when the PDCI now wanted to do precisely this (Crook 1997:228). During the run-up 
to the 1990 elections the FPI had also built up an anti-foreign sentiment that Bédié 
now exploited and further exacerbated.  
 
Before the 1995 elections, the FPI found themselves weakened and politically 
marginalized. They had lost their seats in parliament, leaving the RDR as the official 
opposition (ibid.:229). They probably saw their chances of electoral success as 
marginal, and at the same time they were critical of the way the government prepared 
the elections. The FPI decided to join forces with the RDR to form the Front 
Républicain, to protest the Electoral Code and the exclusion of Ouattara, and to 
boycott the elections through what they called the Active Boycott, which included 
actively sabotaging the elections. The two major opposition parties thus managed to 
discredit the elections in face of public opinion and internationally, and they left 
president Bédié considerably politically weakened.  
2.4.4 RDR: Manipulating ethnicity and religion in the north 
Although nationalist and xenophobic sentiments were clearly provoked and 
manipulated by Bédié and the PDCI and by Bédié and Gbagbo, the RDR, on the other 
side, may also be seen to have created and strengthened ethnic and religious 
cleavages through their way of handling the conflict. In their view, Alassane Ouattara 
was excluded from politics because he was a northerner and a Muslim. Their strategy 
was to mobilize the support of Ivorians of the north and Muslims in particular 
through telling them that they were excluded by the political elite on grounds of their 
ethnic affiliation and their religion.  
2.4.5 Ethnic cleavages and baoulé dominance 
The most obvious aspect of ethnic conflict is the north-south tensions and the 
dominance of the south over the north, which are often portrayed as major causes of 
the rebellion. Another dimension of ethnic conflict, however, is the history of ethnic 
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 tensions in the forest zone of western Côte d’Ivoire, which can help explain the 
emergence of the xenophobic appearance of the FPI of today.  
 
The forest zone was the receiver of large movements of immigration, mostly Baoulé 
people from the Center-East and Sénoufo and Malinké people from northern Côte 
d’Ivoire as well as immigrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. The Houpouët-Boigny 
government strongly supported the settlers and their right to acquire land, as part of 
their strategy for promoting agricultural development for export production. But this 
policy has also been regarded as a way of favoring the Baoulé ethnic group and the 
groups of the north as well as foreigners. These groups have been the most loyal to 
the PDCI, and many analysts see the long-time stability of the Houphouët-Boigny 
presidency as the result of an historical alliance between the dominating Baoulé 
ethnic group, the groups of the north and immigrants. The “losers” in this system 
were the non-Akan12 groups of the southern Côte d’Ivoire, and particularly the 
original population of the forest zone.  
 
The massive acquisition of land by Ivorian and foreign colonists held potential 
conflicts between locals and “newcomers”, which came to the fore as land started to 
become scarce. Although in most communities locals and immigrants lived 
peacefully together, over time there was built up a frustration among the locals over 
the PDCI government and its perceived ethnic bias in favor of the Baoulé, the 
northerners and the foreigners.  
 
It was this frustration that Laurent Gbagbo was able to build upon when the alliance 
between the Baoulé and the North broke after Houphouët’s death. An important part 
of Gbagbo’s constituency is made up of his own ethnic group, the Bété, originating 
from the western region of Gagnoa, which has received great numbers of immigrants 
in the past. 
 
 
12 Baoulé is a sub-group of Akan 
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 In the political sphere, critics have also denounced what they see as “Baoulé 
dominance”. Under Houpouët-Boigny this dominance was moderate, and the 
president was careful at least to give the impression of an inclusive system. Under 
Bédié, however, the Baoulé dominance became more visible. In 1999, he replaced a 
number of civil servants of northern origin with persons from the Baoulé group, as a 
promised reward to party activists for mobilizing informal support groups called the 
Cercle National Bédié (Toungara 2001:67).  
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 3. Theoretical Framework  
Our assumption is that the political breakdown in Côte d’Ivoire is a result of a 
gradual decline in government trust and legitimacy and a parallel growth in protest. 
Why has legitimacy declined and protest grown? Political science theory offers 
various explanations of why social conflicts emerge, governments lose societal trust 
and countries are thrown into war. The first group of theories that will be presented is 
theories on ethnicity. The traditional cleavage in debates on ethnicity is between 
those who see ethnicity as a fundamental psychological attachment and ethnic 
conflict as a result of ancient hatreds between groups (primordialists), and those who 
regard it as a powerful political instrument in the hands of political elites 
(instrumentalists). Both of these are challenged, however, by others who regard 
ethnic identity as but one of several identities, and highlight the need to analyze the 
interplay between ethnicity, economics, and politics, and the reasons why ethnicity 
becomes relevant in specific historical situations. Theories of the neo-patrimonial 
state may help us understand the emergence of “ethnic conflict” in light of economic 
and political developments.  
   
The second group of theories consists of economic explanations. Classical theories in 
political science show how economic structure determines political change, but these 
theories have also been met with critique for ignoring the role of culture in politics. 
We present the theory of relative deprivation, which offers a model for analyzing 
under what circumstances and how economics influences politics. Recent arguments 
about “greed and grievance” –the claim that war is as much a result of elites’ 
aspirations to profit as of social grievance – will also be touched upon.  
 
In the last section of the chapter, the concept of political accountability is discussed. 
While state legitimacy is widely assumed to be strengthened by the transition to 
multiparty democracy, it may paradoxically be threatened by related public sector 
reforms when these are promoted by foreign actors. The active role of international 
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 actors may shift the accountability of government and administration officers away 
from their national constituencies and towards international actors, thereby 
undermining governmental trust and impeding the development of a culture of 
democracy and participation.  
3.1 Theories on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict  
Conflicts in Africa are rarely discussed without a reference to ethnicity. However, 
there is no agreement as to the exact role that ethnicity plays in the development of 
conflict. In the following we will give an overview of different theoretical 
perspectives on ethnicity and ethnopolitics and their role in African intrastate 
conflicts.  
3.1.1 Primordialism and instrumentalism 
Arguments on how ethnicity emerges and becomes politicized can be placed along a 
continuum between a primordialist and an instrumentalist perspective. This 
dichotomy goes back to the 1950s and ‘60s. While primordialism grew out of studies 
of the “new states” in Africa and Asia and was part of the modernization school, 
instrumentalism can be traced back to the Manchester school of anthropology that 
studied ethnicity of urban African communities in the 1950s (Andreassen 2003:81f).  
 
According to a primordialist view, social organization and politics are deeply 
influenced by primordial attachments such as blood, language, religion, and tradition. 
These attachments are so fundamental that political institutions that ignore them will 
meet difficulties. This was the case, for instance, with the newly independent states 
after decolonization (ibid:80). Eller and Coughland (1993) name three assumptions of 
a primordialist perspective:  
 
- Primordial identities are given, they are a priori. They are natural and 
‘spiritual’ rather than sociological, they have long histories, and all interaction 
is carried out within primordial ties.  
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 - Primordial sentiments are ineffable. Members of ethnic groups feel group 
attachment as natural and necessary, and they are compelled and overpowered 
to feel this attachment.  
- Primordialism is fundamentally a question of emotion and affect.  
(Eller and Coughland 1993, quoted in Andreassen 2003) 
 
Opposed to primoridalism is instrumentalism, where ethnicity is seen as an 
instrument used for political or material purposes. In this perspective, people 
mobilize to compete for resources or in other ways fight for their interests, and 
ethnicity might be used as a tool for mobilization. Political elites, for example, may 
find it useful to encourage or even to create ethnic affiliations in order to gather 
political support. In other words, ethnic identity is a dynamic phenomenon, which can 
change according to political change. Far from primordialist perceptions of ethnicity 
as given or ineffable, instrumentalists see ethnicity as a political phenomenon 
responding to a large extent to changes in social and political circumstances.  
 
Primordialists and instrumentalists share, however, the understanding of ethnicity as a 
major independent force in politics. The difference lies in how they view the origins 
of ethnicity and the ways in which they assume ethnicity to influence politics.  
3.1.2 Ethnopolitics 
In his book “Ethnopolitics” from 1981, Joseph Rothschild analyzes the role of 
ethnicity in politics. He sees ethnicity as a modern political phenomenon. In line with 
an instrumentalist perspective, he sees ethnicity is a “plastic, variegated, and 
originally ascriptive trait that, in certain historical and socio-economic circumstances, 
is readily politicized.” (Rothschild 1981:1). In modern and modernizing societies he 
finds that such fertile circumstances for the politicization of ethnicity abound. This is 
because these societies have structured interethnic inequalities as well as 
entrepreneurs who have an interest in mobilizing ethnicity into political leverage to 
alter or reinforce these structured inequalities. As a consequence of this, “in modern 
and transitional societies – unlike traditional ones – politicized ethnicity has become 
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 the crucial principle of political legitimation and delegitimation of systems, states, 
regimes, and governments” (ibid:2, emphasis added).   
 
Rothschild proposes a model where ethnic conflict is determined by a) inequities in 
the distribution of resources to different ethnic groups and b) the ethnic groups’ 
uneven access to the state (ibid.) This model assumes a conscious choice of identities 
among the people as well as agency among political leaders (traditional and modern). 
Leading from this, he offers a definition of the politicization of ethnicity: To 
politicize ethnicity is to “render people cognitively aware of the relevance of politics 
to the health of their ethnic cultural values, and vice versa;.. to stimulate their concern 
about this nexus.. to mobilise them into self-conscious ethnic groups.. and.. to direct 
their behaviour toward activity in the political arena on the basis of this awareness, 
concern, and group consciousness” (ibid.)  
3.1.3 A critique of ethnic conflict 
In her introductory chapter to the book “The Myth of Ethnic Conflict”, Beverly 
Crawford offers an explanation to the rise of conflicts between ethnic groups that 
runs contrary to both primordialist and instrumental interpretations of ethnicity. Her 
argument is that ethnic conflict must be interpreted in light of its economic, political, 
and institutional context. In her view, dominant explanations of ethnic conflict do not 
adequately account for why ethnic conflict arises in some situations and not in others. 
The following account is based on Crawford (1998).  
An institutional approach to ethnic conflict  
Crawford suggests that the key to explaining cultural conflict and cooperation lies in 
political institutions, which can create incentives for cooperation and competition. 
Prevalence of cultural conflict is higher where culture has been historically 
politicized. Institutions in modern states often, however, play a crucial role in 
cementing, creating, or attenuating cultural or identity politics that have been created 
in historical power struggles. Crawford claims that institutional change is often the 
trigger of violent ethnic conflict. Her argument has three steps: a)the politicization of 
cultural identity, b)institutional change, political entrepreneurs, and bandwagoning 
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 and c)globalization and political liberalization as triggers of institutional change and 
the breakdown of social contracts. I will discuss each in turn.  
 
Politicization of cultural identity: Social interests and divisions can be defined in 
many different ways, of which ethnic divisions is one. But although different 
divisions exist, not all of them become politically relevant. If ethnic divisions are to 
provoke conflict, they first have to be politicized; cultural identities must be 
transformed into political identities. Political institutions can either legitimate or 
attenuate politicized cultural identities. In Latin America, it was class rather than 
ethnicity that became a politically relevant division, whereas in Africa ethnicity has 
more typically become politicized. How and why do cultural or ethnic divisions 
become politically relevant? One example can be found in colonial policies where 
colonial powers used divide-and-rule tactics along ethnic lines. These policies created 
the opportunity for political entrepreneurs among colonized groups to draw on 
cultural identities to mobilize resistance to imperial control, gain access to political 
power and territory, and exercise power in the construction of new national 
institutions when colonial power collapsed. In apartheid South Africa and in the 
period of slavery and Jim Crow laws in the United States race was politicized by 
internal political elites in ways that led to similar historical struggles (Crawford 1998: 
18). 
 
Such historical struggles that transformed cultural identity into political identity 
always required political entrepreneurs, individual leaders, and elites to interpret 
discrimination or privilege in ways that made cultural identity politically relevant to 
their targeted constituencies. It was, however, the institutions of the central state that 
determined whether or not politicized cultural identity would be cemented in social 
and political practice and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, 
separatism, or the right to participate with others in the political arena (ibid.:20). In 
the Soviet Union, institutions created new cultural divisions that did not previously 
exist. In Yugoslavia, institutions reinforced cultural divisions that had historically 
been created by political entrepreneurs. It was always the institutions of the central 
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 state that set the terms of the social contract. The state can either strengthen or 
weaken the politicization of ethnicity, depending on the importance it gives to ethnic 
divisions as compared to other divisions. States that privilege one or several ethnic 
groups over others in terms of political participation or resource distribution, for 
example, legitimate politicized cultural divisions and may intensify or even create 
political groups based on identity. Conversely, states that base their rules of 
participation and resource allocation on other criteria than cultural divisions weaken 
the political relevance of cultural differences. Universal suffrage and citizenship 
rights base political identity on individual criteria rather than cultural identity, and 
may attenuate the political relevance of ethnicity. Such rules, however, need 
supportive institutions like a representative political system, a functioning judicial 
system and a police force as well as allocative institutions to protect cultural groups 
from discrimination.  
 
Whether or not political conflict will escalate into violent conflict is highly dependent 
on institutional legitimacy and strength. When state institutions are strong, resource 
allocation considered fair, and political competition and representation secured, 
ethnic violence is not likely despite “ethnic” policies of privilege and compensation.  
 
When institutions are considered illegitimate, on the other hand, for example if one or 
several groups are excluded from political participation or from privileged resource 
allocation, social grievance and political resentment and distrust will prevail. 
However, if state institutions remain strong, they may be able to oppress resistance so 
that violent conflict does not erupt. Violent conflict is likely to break out when state 
institutions are weakened in societies that have a high level of social resentment, 
which in turn is the outcome of previous institutional encouragement of identity 
politics (ibid.:24).  
 
Institutional change, political entrepreneurs, and bandwagoning: In societies where 
ethnicity is politicized, political legitimacy low, and institutions put under pressure or 
weakened, political entrepreneurs may emerge who have both the incentive and the 
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 opportunity to exploit cultural cleavages and perceived inequalities in an effort to 
mobilize popular support. This may succeed if political institutions encourage 
identity politics and if prohibitions against the practice of extreme identity politics are 
weak. As entrepreneurs start to practice identity politics, the cost for others to join 
decrease, and as support for these policies becomes widespread, the costs of not 
joining may increase. Likewise, identity policies spread from one ethnic group to 
others when leaders and members of groups see another group mobilizing behind 
ethnic slogans. Ethnicity policies are thus created as a defensive strategy, and further 
accentuate tensions. These processes, which can be termed “bandwagon effects”, may 
escalate ethnic tensions and provoke violence.  
 
In situations of resource scarcity and institutional weakness, leaders may be tempted 
to privilege particular ethnic groups, because patronage networks of resource 
distribution have few transaction costs. This is what happened in Yugoslavia, where a 
weakening of the central government caused regional party elites to take over more 
and more of the allocative authority. The deepening economic crisis and the collapse 
of the social welfare system made their role and their patronage networks 
increasingly important and increased the political significance of cultural bonds 
(ibid.:25).  
 
Globalization, liberalization, institutional change, and social contracts: In societies 
where ethnicity has been politicized and deep divisions exist, conflict may still be 
attenuated by a social contract which, although privileging certain groups over others 
and considered unfair, still may provide all groups with sufficient resources to 
prevent the resort to violence. However, in a situation where state institutions that 
have traditionally maintained a social contract attenuating ethnic conflict are 
weakened and are no longer able to uphold the social contract, this opens political 
space for “ethnic entrepreneurs” to mobilize support. Likewise, when state 
institutions that have repressed dissent by force, are weakened and no longer have the 
means to maintain the repression, they leave the way for violent actions by 
minorities.  
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According to Crawford, the most important factors leading to the weakening of state 
institutions and the breakup of social contracts are the global trends of globalization 
and the national responses of economic liberalization that deprive state institutions of 
resources. Although a weakening of the state may have many different reasons, like 
corruption, bureaucratic rigidity, or constitutional changes, a weakening due to a 
diminution of state resources is especially harmful, because it deprives the state of its 
distributive capacities. When the resources of institutions that have previously 
provided accepted distributive channels are diminished, and the institutions withdraw 
from their distributive role, those who are disadvantaged by that withdrawal blame 
the state for their hardships, and the state loses legitimacy (ibid.:33). 
3.1.4 Ethnicity in context: The rise and decline of the neo-patrimonial state  
Like Crawford and Lipschutz, Braathen, Bøås and Sæther question the use of 
ethnicity as an independent driving force in politics, and highlight the need to analyze 
the economic and political history of ethnic identities. They criticize the tendency to 
view ethnicity either as a “leftover from a bygone age and a barrier to modernization” 
(cfr. primordialism) or as “merely a destructive political weapon in the hands of 
political leaders” (cfr. instrumentalism) (Braathen et.al. 2000:4f), and emphasize the 
need to examine why ethnicity becomes politically relevant. According to these 
authors, the prominence of ethnicity in contemporary conflicts in Africa can be 
explained by the rise and decline of the neo-patrimonial state.  
 
The concept of the neo-patrimonial state has been used by Jean-Francois Médard and 
others to describe the functioning of the state in Africa. It builds upon Weber’s 
identification of patrimonial authority as a sub-group of traditional authority.13 
Following Weber, the main characteristic of patrimonialism is the confusion between 
the private and the public sector (Médard 1996: 86). Power is personalized and access 
 
13 According to Weber, the authority of political rulers may be based upon traditional, charismatic, or legal-rational 
authority. Within the definition of traditional authority Weber identifies three sub-groups; namely patriarchal, patrimonial, 
and feudal, where patriarchal is limited to the family, patrimonial is the logic of patriarchy extended to a larger social unit 
and dependent on middlemen, and feudalism is the most decentralized where the loyalty between lord and vassal is 
institutionalized into informal “contracts” (Weber 1997; Médard 1996) 
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 to political power can be transformed into economic power through clientelistic and 
patronage practices of social distribution, where economic favors are given from the 
ruler in exchange for loyalty or support from the ruled. Médard has found that 
postcolonial African states developed a system where these characteristics were 
predominant on a national level, although in these states the patrimonial logics were 
modified and restrained by formal political institutions. Neo-patrimonialism thus 
refers to a system where patrimonial rule coexists with a formal bureaucratic system 
of legal rational authority. According to Ankie Hoogvelt, neo-patrimonialism 
developed as a response to a situation where states were weak, lacking legitimacy, 
and confronted with coalitions of rent-seeking strongmen using alternative power 
bases. (Hoogvelt 2001:188).  
 
Although neo-patrimonial practices naturally are not confined to Africa, but on the 
contrary to be found in all political systems, Bratton and van de Walle argue that neo-
patrimonialism is the core feature of politics in Africa and in a small number of other 
states, because personal relationships constitute the foundation and superstructure of 
political institutions in these states (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62).   
 
The relationship between a neo-patrimonial pattern of resource distribution and 
political legitimacy and stability is an ambiguous one: On the one hand, neo-
patrimonial networks can be integrative and produce political stability. In a patron-
client relationship, the clients provide the patron with political support, and to the 
extent that the patron-client networks include a majority of the population, it is an 
efficient, though not egalitarian or democratic, way of securing political legitimacy 
and thereby stability (Bøås and Dokken 2002:164). On the other hand, a neo-
patrimonial distribution pattern draws heavily on state resources, creating a pressure 
on the state that can eventually threaten the legitimacy and stability of the system 
(Andreassen 2003). Médard puts it this way: “When patrimonialism is exacerbated it 
becomes self destructive”. Eventually, there will be little left to exploit (Médard 
1996: 95).  
 
 43
 Some authors have suggested that the neo-patrimonial African state was undermined 
by the economic recession in the 1980s and 1990s. When state revenues declined as a 
result of commodity price falls and decreased aid, African leaders were no longer 
able to uphold these expensive practices of clientelism, and the neo-patrimonial form 
of legitimacy built up over decades disappeared, without being replaced by other 
adequate forms of legitimacy (Bøås and Dokken 2002; Hoogvelt 2001).  
 
When this happens, and the state no longer has the means to uphold its authority, the 
space is opened up for individual officials and other “strongmen” who pursue their 
own interests. Gradually the state becomes “criminalized” (Braathen et.al 2000:15).  
If these conflicts get militarized, and war breaks out, ethnic identity is often 
mobilized by the different contenders (ibid.) Ethnic hostilities can thus be a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of civil war.  
3.2 Economic Explanations of Protest and Conflict  
3.2.1 Does economics determine politics, or the other way around?  
The relationship between economic structure and political system is an old theme in 
political science. To Marx it was changes in the structure of production that produced 
political change. Weber, on the other hand, favored the primacy of culture: the rise of 
capitalism, the Industrial Revolution, and the Democratic Revolution was to a large 
extent a result of the emergence of the Protestant Ethic (Inglehart 1997:9) 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, theorists of the Modernization School assumed that the social 
and cultural changes following modernization would in turn lead to democratization 
in developing countries, like they were said to have done in the West. They assumed 
that “all good things go together”, meaning that societies who experienced economic 
and social development would also experience democratization, but the economic 
changes were assumed to come first.  
 
Although more conscious of political processes, social scientists like Seymour Martin     
Lipset, Barrington Moore, and Robert A. Dahl agreed with Rostow that political 
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 developments depended upon economic structure and changes. Lipset established that 
industrialization, urbanization, and rising levels of wealth and education created good 
conditions for stable elected government (Lipset 1981). To Barrington Moore, the 
growth of a commercial bourgeoisie would lead to democracy, as the new middle 
class would demand political reform to secure their personal freedoms and property 
rights vis-à-vis the old landed aristocracy (Moore 1996). Robert A. Dahl (1971) 
argued that countries with a high level of socio-economic development would be 
more likely to be democracies because they generally had higher level of education 
and communication, a more pluralistic social order, and prevented extreme 
inequalities.  
 
Analyses that, contrary to economic explanations, favor the primacy of culture, often 
take as their starting point Almond and Verba’s “The Civic Culture” (1965). This 
study is concerned with the cultural conditions for democracy and mass participation. 
The authors argue that democratization requires the establishment of a political 
culture based on persuasion, consensus and diversity; what they call “the civic 
culture” (Almond and Verba 1965:6).  
 
Samuel Huntington (1968) shared the modernization therorists’ view that modernity 
was likely to lead to democratization, but argued that the process of modernization, 
on the contrary, more likely would produce instability. While modernization brings 
people both increased economic opportunities and increased expectations, the 
expectations are likely to grow faster than economic opportunities, thus creating a 
gap between people’s aspirations and their possibility to fulfill them. This gap 
produces a social frustration that can be destabilizing if the mobility opportunities are 
low and political institutions weak and not capable of containing the rising demands 
on them by increasingly conscious and socially frustrated citizens.  
 
3.2.2 Determinants of conflict: What role for economics?  
It is a reasonable assumption that violent rebellion is more likely in times of 
economic hardships than in affluent times. Empirical research supports this 
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 assumption at a general level. Boswell and Dixon (1990:554) and Muller and Weede 
(1990:648) found that high rates of economic growth reduce the incidence of violent 
rebellion and political violence (Auvinen 1997:178). Other studies have showed that 
level of economic development in a society correlates negatively with political 
violence (Hardy (1979), Weede (1981), Zimmermann (1980:177), all referred in 
Auvinen1997:179). However, the relationship between economic level and political 
conflict is not a simple one; for example those least likely of political protest and 
violence may often be the very poorest, who have to spend all their resources on daily 
survival. One tool for analyzing the relation between economy and conflict is 
provided by Ted Robert Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation.   
 
Gurr used the term “relative deprivation” to explain people’s incentives to use violent 
rebellion (Gurr 1970). He defined relative deprivation as “actors’ perception of 
discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (ibid:24), 
where value expectations of a collectivity were “the average value positions to which 
its members believe they are justifiably entitled”, and value capabilities were “the 
average value positions [a collectivity’s] members perceive themselves capable of 
attaining or maintaining”.  The sources of an individual’s value standards can be a 
reference group, the individual’s past condition, an abstract ideal, or the standards 
articulated by a leader (ibid:25). Political violence is thus seen as a result of people’s 
frustration over their living conditions. It is not the level of material welfare in itself 
that determines conflict, but rather the extent to which the level of welfare is 
perceived as unjust. 
 
Gurr identifies three patterns of relative deprivation. Decremental deprivation is 
where deprivation is experienced in relations to past conditions; that is, when 
conditions have worsened. Aspirational deprivation refers to a situation where value 
expectations rise whereas value capabilities remain constant. This can happen when 
traditional societies are exposed to, or come to know of, better material ways of life. 
It can also happen when industrialization and growth in a society gives some people 
better living conditions, whereas the majority don’t experience this change. Finally, 
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 progressive deprivation refers to the mechanism showed by Davies’ J-curve14; that is 
where a long-term economic and social improvement generates expectations of 
continued improvement, but is interrupted by stagnation or decline.  
3.2.3 Greed or grievance?  
Deprivation theories have been attacked in recent years for over-focusing the “pull 
factor” of economic deprivation and underscoring the “push factor” that rebellion and 
war may be a lucrative business for some. Collier and others have argued that the 
prospect of income from control over natural resources is an essential motivation for 
rebel leaders. In a quantitative study of 161 countries, Collier (2000) found that his 
indicators of greed corresponded with violent conflict, whereas his indicators of 
grievance did not.15  
 
While Collier’s perspective may be useful in turning our attention to the economic 
motivations of elites in war, it has also been met with criticism. Luckham et.al. 
(2001) point out that greed may have become more important with the weakening of 
the state in the last decade, but that it is more useful as an explanatory factor for some 
conflicts (Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the two Congos) than for others. They 
further criticize the distinction between greed and grievance motives as simplistic. Is 
not youth impoverishment, for example, which lead young men to join rebel groups 
(or militias), a sign of grievance as much as of greed?  
3.3 Political Accountability  
For a political system and its government to be legitimate, the government has to 
prove its legitimacy through following certain principles or leading policies that are 
acceptable to those who are the source of their legitimacy. In a democratic system, 
the source of legitimacy is the electorate, and the government thus is accountable to, 
 
14 Davies was concerned about the prospects for revolutions, and held that these were most likely to occur “where a 
prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal” (Davies quoted in 
Gurr 1970:52) 
15 As indicators of greed he used primary commodities as a percentage of GDP, the percentage of young men aged 15-24 
years in a population, and education level. As indicators of grievance he used the degree of ethnic or religious 
fractionalization in a society, inequality in land ownership, degree of political rights, and per capita growth rate in the 
economy in the previous five years. (See Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler (2000)).  
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 that is answers for its policies and actions to, the electorate. If leaders can not 
adequately answer to the electorate for their policies, legitimacy is weakened and 
protest and violence may occur. Political stability thus requires a well-functioning 
system of internal accountability.  
 
Economic and political changes in African states in the last decades may be expected 
to have contradictory effects on accountability between the rulers and the ruled. On 
the one hand, the legalization of political parties and interest-organizations and the 
introduction of multiparty systems would be expected to create openness and a 
possibility for the public to rid themselves of political leaders who don’t live up to 
expectations, which would clearly enhance accountability and hence also democracy. 
On the other hand, some of the economic changes that have occurred due to 
globalization and economic liberalization may have narrowed the policy space for 
rulers and thus limiting their ability to respond to public demands. Furthermore, a 
general perception that “leaders are not in full control of policymaking” due to close 
and constant dialogue with external actors may weaken their legitimacy (Bratton and 
van de Walle 1997:133).  
 
Christopher Clapham has described the process of donor and creditor conditionalities 
in the 1990s as a process of “externalization of political accountability”, as these 
claims led African government’s attention towards the donor community more than 
to their internal constituencies. Although Clapham uses “externalization of political 
accountability” specifically to describe political conditionalities of the 1990s, as 
opposed to the macroeconomic conditionalities of the 1980s, it is possible to extend 
the concept to covering the economic conditionalities. Intended or not, in the process 
of policy reform governments became more accountable to external than internal 
actors, although the internal political opposition naturally used external actors as 
allies and also influenced them (Clapham 1996).  
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 3.3.1 “Choiceless Democracies” as a result of economic reform  
Turning to the effects of economic changes on accountability, Thandika Mkandawire 
has described how the requirements of institutions has had the effect of producing 
“Choiceless Democracies” that faces a challenge of internal legitimacy as they strive 
to adhere to the demands of the international institutions. He argues that Structural 
Adjustment can influence the competence and reach of democratically elected 
governments on at least three levels: the level of objectives, the level of instruments, 
and the level of structural constraints (Mkandawire 1999:123).  
 
At the level of objectives, the choice of African governments clearly was limited by 
the fiscal and foreign exchange crisis that was the background for the involvement of 
the Bretton Woods institutions. However, in Mkandawire’s view, their choice was 
further constrained by the particular solutions imposed by the institutions (ibid). The 
adjustment programs set forth macro-economic stabilization as the overriding 
objective, whereas other goals, such as national capacities to initiate and sustain 
change, resource mobilization, structural reforms and the social sustainability of the 
policies, were neglected. 
 
Further, the narrowing of the choice of political objectives has worsened the already 
very serious challenges to elected governments of creating political legitimacy. In the 
authoritarian states of post-independence Africa, the quest for legitimacy was central, 
and power was legitimized by the ability of the political authorities to promote public 
welfare. Democratization has opened space for economic interests to organize 
themselves and has led to pressures on government from various contending groups, 
exemplified by massive strike waves in some countries. However, in this same 
period, the main priorities of governments have not been to address these social and 
political demands, but rather to adhere to orthodox adjustment programs (ibid:124). 
As these programs are often very unpopular, they run the risk of delegitimizing 
democratic rule if tangible results are not perceived. 
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 Finally, the tendency of adjustment programs to come as “packaged and sealed” 
(ibid:124), limits the domain of competence of democratic governance by foreclosing 
debates on issues such as income distribution, taxation, and protection or non-
protection of certain economic activities. On a more general level, the intellectual and 
ideological dominance of the view that there is no alternative to liberalism and 
economic orthodoxy undermines the task of building a democratic political culture, 
and encourages politics of no compromise.  
 
At the level of instruments, Mkandawire argues that constraints on policy instruments 
imposed by adjustment can lead to a blunting or even a loss of instruments necessary 
for democratically elected governments to manage their economies and other national 
issues. First, relations between African governments and the financial institutions are 
heavily influenced by the legacy of authoritarian rule. Under authoritarian rule, power 
was concentrated in the president’s office and in the bureaucracy, with little real 
power left to the ministers. Further, bureaucrats were not used to their work being 
subject to parliamentary or public scrutiny. This created a cult of secrecy that did not 
disappear with democratization. This cult of secrecy is also very much prevalent in 
relations with aid donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Actually, Mkandawire 
holds that there is a whole tradition of interaction between foreign donors and African 
governments that has been premised on this institutional premise. Post-authoritarian 
governments are faced with powerful technocracies in their own bureaucracies who 
have strong international networks. With the increasing presence of the Bretton 
Woods institutions the position of these technocracies is further strengthened, while 
at the same time the officials of the World Bank themselves exercise substantial 
power to scrutinize and criticize public policies. The same possibility does not apply 
to the parliament. In this way, democratic control of state policy is undermined. 
 
Secondly, the World Bank since 1989 has been stressing the importance of good 
governance for the successful implementation of reforms. However, their perception 
of governance from the outset was essentially technocratic, with the inclusion of 
democracy into the understanding of governance came much later (ibid:126). 
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 Mkandawire argues that “it is part of conventional economic wisdom that the general 
public, included elected political leaders, cannot understand the counter-intuitive 
nature of good economic advice”. Therefore, there is a tendency to believe that the 
basic democratic practices of seeking consensus and compromise are a waste of time, 
and in their place, technocratic governance is recommended.  
 
Lastly, at the level of structural constraints, while many African democracies have 
inherited heavy national debts and messy fiscal affairs (ibid:130), with respect to SAP 
negotiations, they also inherited fixed targets or restrictions on policy instruments that 
had been agreed between the IFIs and the “old” governments and were presented to 
the new democratic governments as non-negotiable (ibid).  
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 4. Dynamics of Conflict: Economic Deprivation, 
Nationalism and Political Violence   
In Chapter 2.1 we described the increasing political tensions in Côte d’Ivoire in the 
1990s, manifest in violent disputes about citizenship, land rights, and eligibility. We 
saw how the political elites have politicized nationality and how xenophobic 
sentiments have grown in the population following the Ivoirité discourse. In this 
chapter we will discuss possible explanations of this increased nationalism and 
accompanying political tension. Why did the leadership of the major political parties 
choose increasingly to rely upon nationalistic rhetoric and politics of exclusion, and 
why did they succeed in getting support for this from the public? While most analyses 
of Ivoirité focus on historical tensions between ethnic groups and personal political 
tactics and power struggles, we will in addition look at how changes in economic and 
social conditions can help illuminate both elite strategies and popular response.  
 
The discussion is organized around the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 
3, namely, primordialist, instrumentalist, and institutional approaches to ethnicity 
(4.1), economic changes and relative deprivation (4.2), and changes in political 
accountability (4.3).   
4.1 Ethnic Tensions?  
The perception of the Ivorian conflict as an ethnic conflict not only relates to 
differences between “nationals” and “foreigners” and between “southerners” and 
“northerners”, but also to generation-old tensions between the Baoulé and the Bété, 
particularly in the forest zone, which have been highlighted as a root cause of the 
conflict (see Chapter 2). The aim of this section is to discuss to what extent 
theoretical approaches to ethnicity, as presented in Chapter 3.1, are useful tools to 
understand the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.  
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 4.1.1 “Ancient hatreds” 
Difficult relationships between population groups are not new in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Western regions have a long history of conflict between the original population and 
migrants from other parts of Côte d’Ivorie (see Chapter 2). Some scholars argue that 
ethnic identities and a history of ethnic antagonisms characterize the Ivorian society 
and are key factors to understand the current crisis. Jeanne Maddox Toungara 
(2001:64f.) describes the development of nationalism, xenophobia, and tensions on 
the basis of the country’s demographic characteristics and ethnic identities:   
 
“Since independence in 1960, there has been little change in the way the peoples of 
this small West African nation perceive themselves. Foremost in their psyches is their 
identity as members of regional extended-family and corporate kin groups competing 
with others for their share of scarce economic resources…”  
 
Explanations that use ethnic or other family-based identities as the starting point for 
understanding social phenomena, characterize the primordialist school. A 
primordialist view holds that conflicts between groups are the result of antagonisms 
that are based on ethnic affiliation and have been built up over the years.  
 
Conflicts over land in the forest zone of Côte d’Ivoire are often described by old 
antagonisms between groups. However, Jean-Pierre Chauveau, who has studied the 
land question in Western Côte d’Ivoire, argues that the frequent land tenure conflicts 
between locals and non-Ivorian migrants must be analyzed in light of institutional 
changes following the economic crisis. Institutional arrangements like the “tutorat” or 
guardianship between locals and immigrants has traditionally ensured the influence of 
the state and at the same time regulated the relationship between locals and migrants 
and between rural and urban populations (Chauveau 2003). With the economic crisis, 
the complex institutional arrangements that had previously ensured stability were 
threatened.  
 
 53
 In Chauveau’s view, these institutional arrangements have contributed to shaping 
people’s sense of identity. This approach poses a problem for a primordialist 
understanding which would see identity as given, not as subject to influence from 
institutional or other factors. Chauveau’s arguments will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4.2.2. 
 
In the last decades, ethnic group belonging has also become an important identity 
mark in urban areas. A simple “ancient hatreds”-explanation fails, however, to 
explain why these identities have become politically explosive only in the last 
decade. While it might be true that people in Côte d’Ivoire have always identified 
themselves with their ethnic group, why have these identities only recently broken 
out in violent conflict?  
4.1.2 Elite manipulation 
While primordialist perspectives on ethnicity are rare in debates on the Ivorian 
conflict, analyses which lie close to instrumentalist perspectives are more widespread. 
In fact instrumentalist perspectives on ethnicity seem to fit very well with the 
dominating analyses of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, focusing on manipulations of 
identity by the elite through what we have called the Ivoirité discourse.16 According 
to an instrumentalist view on ethnicity, ethnic conflict appears when political leaders 
see it in their interest to enhance ethnic sentiments. In Côte d’Ivoire the three leaders 
after Houphoët’s death, Bédié, General Gueï, and Gbagbo, have all used their version 
of Ivoirité as a political strategy, whereas Ouattara of the RDR has also mobilized 
almost exclusively on identity to gain support from the large group of “northern” 
Ivoirans. The politics of Ivoirité and the justifications used by its proponents have 
been described in Chapter 2. Here we want to discuss why and to what extent these 
policies –and the conflict itself -can be explained by instrumentalist perspectives.  
 
 
16 A word of caution is due here on the relation between ethnicity and nationalism. Ivoirité is about nationalism –a sense of 
belonging to the Ivorian nation, regardless in principle of ethnic affiliation. However, as we showed in Chapter 2, the 
“intellectual” basis of Ivoirité as defined by Bédié and CURDIPHE, is closely linked to Akan identity and to “the 4 ethnic 
groups original to CI”. Moreover, Ivoirité is interpreted, not only by international observers, but also by Ivorians, as 
defining ethnic divisions. This is especially true of those who feel excluded by the term, but even by Ivoirans who define 
themselves within Ivoirité, one can find this interpretation. Accordingly it is hard to draw a sharp distinction between 
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While primordialists see ethnic identities as a priori given, instrumentalists see them 
rather as political phenomena that may change according to social and political 
change. This understanding of ethnicity can be useful in the analysis of ethnic 
policies in Côte d’Ivoire from the early 1990s. While Ivoirité in Bédié’s version built 
upon and reinforced Akan identity, Gueï’s and Gbagbo’s versions included the non-
Akan groups of the West, and created a dichotomy between “the south” and “the 
north”, both of them incorporating very diverse groups. 
Bédié’s choice  
Ivoirité served several political purposes for Bédié. Importantly, it served as an 
ideological argument to oust his strongest opponent, Alassane Ouattara. Furthermore, 
by starting an anti-foreign rhetoric, Bédié countered a challenge from the FPI and 
Gabgbo, who had been the first to use this type of rhetoric for political purposes, in 
their attempt to deprive foreigners of the vote in the 1990 elections. Bédié thereby 
“stole” one of Gbagbo’s potentially mobilizing causes. Lastly, Ivoirité served to 
legitimize Bédié’s accession to power and the hegemony of the Akan group in 
government (Jolivet 2003:48). The Ivoirité rhetoric can also be seen as a theorization 
of the rights to the increasingly scarce national resources. (Akindès 2004:20).  
Gueï’s choice 
General Robert Gueï, in coming to power after the military coup in December 1999, 
vehemently criticized the ideology of Ivoirité and the corruption of his predecessor’s 
government, and announced a “cleaning of the house”, involving far-reaching 
replacements in strategic sectors like the army and the public administration. 
However, after only a few months in office, Gueï’s tactics changed. He increasingly 
used a xenophobic language and, without using the word Ivoirité, adhered to many of 
its principles. At the same time he left his earlier promises of leaving politics after the 
“cleaning of the house” and started positioning himself as presidential candidate. It 
 
national and ethnic identity, and we therefore find it justified to treat Ivorian nationalist policies as ethnic policies, although 
this involves a certain simplification. 
 55
 was General Gueï who organized the infamous “and-or” referendum, which resulted 
in the limitation of the eligibility to those who had two parents from Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
In Gueï’s version, Ivoirité was not the Akan project it had been from Bédié’s side. 
Gueï, himself a Krou, attacked Akan political dominance and spoke strongly for the 
importance of giving up narrow ethnic interests in the favor of the national interest; 
this was necessary to allow himself to be elected president. His nationalist project 
was thus less exclusionist (and less “ethnic”) than Bédié’s project as far as it included 
all groups of the southern part of the country. It was, however, strongly exclusionist 
towards foreigners and the populations of northern Côte d’Ivoire. It was claimed that 
foreigners had a “hold over vital sectors in the national economy”, and at the same 
time the “Ivorianness” of the northern populations, commonly referred to as “Dioula” 
was questioned. Dioula actually refers to one particular ethnic group, but the term is 
widely used as a common name for several ethnic groups in the northern Côte 
d’Ivoire, who are historically related to groups Mali and Burkina Faso and are 
traditionally Muslim. Religion was also used to exclude: In addition to “foreigners 
taking over the economy”, it was warned that Muslims would “take over” Côte 
d’Ivoire –a “traditionally” Christian country.  
 
Gueï’s sudden shift from morally denouncing Ivoirité to adopting a slightly modified 
version of it, demonstrates, in the view of most observers, how he was pursuing his 
own personal gains, and trying to prepare his own accession to the Presidency. This 
also seemed to be the interpretation of many Ivorians, who turned his back on the 
man in whom many of them had put their hopes to “clean the house”.   
Gbagbo’s choice 
Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI have often been criticized for “abandoning their 
principles” when failing to break with the Ivoirité ideology from Bédié. However, we 
have seen that the nationalism in FPI had its own history – dating from before Bédié 
started using the term Ivoirité. The use of xenophobic rhetoric and policies on the FPI 
side was a born out of the struggle against the one-party regime, when the opposition 
wanted to rid the PDCI-friendly foreign population of their voting rights. Gbagbo 
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 wanted to be seen as the one defending ordinary Ivorians’ interests in face of the 
single party elite and of foreign interests, be it French “neo-colonial” interests, World 
Bank and IMF “Western imperialist” interests or the interests of other West African 
countries and their nationals residing in Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, Alassane 
Ouattara’s role in the repression of the opposition, while he simultaneously was seen 
as an “IMF boy” (Jarret and Mahieu 2002) and a Burkinabè, added to FPI 
nationalism.  
 
From the FPIs side, its xenophobic policy developed in parallel with a deep criticism 
of the economic policies of the PDCI regime. The FPI opposed the ruling party’s 
French-oriented policies, and wanted to loosen French grips on the Ivorian economy. 
At the same time, they were deeply skeptical of the economic reform policies 
promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. Their political argumentation was, and 
still is, an anti-imperialist, nationalist one.  
 
Before the 1995 presidential election, however, Gbagbo chose to ally with Alassane 
Ouattara in the Front Républicain to counter the power of Bédié and the PDCI. This 
was a radical shift in more than one sense: He allied with the person who to many 
was the personification of the “foreigners’ influence” in Côte d’Ivoire, which he 
himself had been attacking. Furthermore, the leader of the socialist party and of the 
broader movement of the left now allied with the republican party, which was seen by 
many as an “ultra-liberal” party, although the RDR itself has always claimed to be in 
the “center” politically. Gbagbo’s choice to align with Ouattara caused a split in the 
Ivoirian left: Many were disappointed of the fact that Gbagbo had abandoned his old 
allies on the left and the broader movement and no longer saw him as their leader. 
This tactical move from Gbagbo thus contributed strongly to give Ivorian politics the 
characteristics of a personalized power-struggle; or what in French is called “la 
politique politicienne”. 17
 
 
17 This expression can be translated ”the politics of politicians” and refers to a situation where the power struggle between 
politicians dominates politics, isolated from the content of politics.  
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 So, you see, there is a strange situation, where the FPI is directly with the RDR. And 
the classical opposition, the ideological opposition, the revolutionary left, no longer 
exists…In the end, the opposition becomes a purely tactical opposition.      
        Konaté Sidiki 2004 (interview) 
 
In tactical alliance with Ouattara, Gbagbo advocated strongly for Ouattara’s right to 
stand for election, attacking the Electoral Code as “anti-liberty, racist, xenophobic 
and dangerous” (Jeune Afrique 1796, 1-7 Dec. 1994, cited in Crook 1997: 229). 
Gbagbo, who was acknowledged as the leader of the alliance (the Popular Front), 
probably saw this as his only chance to mobilize against Bédié, and the price he had 
to pay was to support the RDR in its fight against the Electoral Code of December 
1994 and support for more inclusive eligibility and voting legislation (Crook 1997: 
229). As late as October 1999, Gbagbo stated:  
 
“We have to let everyone present themselves … We cannot have in Côte d’Ivoire, 
quarrels, struggles, and civil wars because someone wants to be President or 
someone wants to stay President”  
   Laurent Gbagbo October 20, 1999, quoted in Le Pape 2002: 22 
 
It is also important to note that it was Bédié who had limited the vote to citizens and 
introduced the Carte de séjour; and it was Gueï, not Gbagbo, who, after a 
referendum, changed the article 35 in the Constitution limiting the eligibility for the 
presidency to citizens with both parents from Côte d’Ivoire (the “and-or” 
referendum). Gbagbo might have won the elections in 2000 as a result of this 
legislation, but it was not he who had made it. However, once in power, Gbagbo took 
advantage of the new situation and once again openly denounced Ouattara’s 
candidacy:  
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 “I am shocked that someone who has been Vice President of the Central Bank of 
Western African States in the capacity of Upper Volta, official of the IMF for Upper 
Volta, I am shocked that he is candidate here”.  
      Laurent Gbagbo, March 20, 2000, quoted in Le Pape 2002: 32 
 
Ouattara’s choice  
Most analyses of ethnic politics in Côte d’Ivoire confine themselves to the ethnic and 
nationalist policies led by the persons and parties in power, namely Bédié, Gueï, and 
Gbagbo. Here we want in addition to look at the “other side”: how Alassane Ouattara 
and his supporters used identity as a means of mobilizing political support, and hence 
contributed to the “ethnitization” of politics.   
 
The RDR, originally founded by disappointed PDCI supporters who disagreed with 
the party’s economic policies and party culture, soon found their major source of 
support in the population of the northern regions. Responding to the Ivoirité discourse 
and capitalizing on the growing sentiment in the North of social and political 
exclusion, the RDR chose to focus their political mobilization on groups that were 
inclined to feel victimized by these policies.  
 
The discontent and feeling of exclusion in the north and among immigrants and 
Muslims was not created by Ouattara and the RDR, but was probably enhanced by 
them. As early as 1992, two years before the RDR broke out of the PDCI, a “Charter 
of the Grand North” had started circulating, which claimed better political 
representation from the north (Akindès 2004:18). Ouattara managed to canalize a 
great deal of this discontent into support for himself. In the words of Venance Konan, 
commentator in the leading newspaper Fraternité Matin:  
 
“He sent –he was intelligent too- he had a good team, they went to the countryside 
and said: ‘They exclude you, but if you vote for Mr Alassane Ouattara, he will 
rehabilitate you… Every time they beat a Muslim, it gave ten votes to Mr Alassane 
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 Ouattara. When they destroyed an identity card of someone, that gave ten more votes 
to Alassane Ouattara. That’s how all the North gathered behind him.”  
            Vénance Konan 2004 (interview) 
        
As long as Ouattara was excluded by law as a presidential candidate, the decision of 
the RDR to boycott the elections should not surprise, as long as the party was indeed 
founded as a means to further his candidacy. Although, as Crook notes, Ouattara 
never confirmed that he wanted to pose his candidacy - and it is very possible that he 
could actually have been able to do so if he had decided to try the Electoral Law 
before the High Court (Crook 1997:228) - he might have considered that the chance 
of “playing the martyr” would serve him in the long run and was the best option 
given the dominance of the PDCI over the election process. Ouattara seemed, like his 
opponents, to prefer the focus on identity politics to that of other political issues. In 
the run-up to the 1995 elections, the RDR took up the “inflammatory language of the 
Charter of the North, talking darkly of Baoulé domination, tribalism and the 
possibility of civil war” (ibid: 229).  
 
“[The Republican Front] did not at any point enter into any debate about the merits 
of its programme for government, but seemed to assume that the supposed exclusion 
of Ouattara from the elections was sufficient justification for people to support the 
opposition”.  
Crook 1997: 230 
 
In summary, all the three post-Houphouët leaders used Ivoirité – although in different 
versions – as a tool for their own personal and political gain. Ouattara, although he 
did not use ethnicity in the same way as his opponents, also used the focus on identity 
politics to his own gain.  
 
So far instrumentalism seems to be proven right: To judge from the political 
strategies of the political leaders, their primary goals have been political power, and 
“playing the ethnic card” has been a useful strategy to that end.  
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The question that remains, however, is how the space has been opened up for a 
personal power struggle to dominate Ivorian political life since the late 1990s. Are the 
death of Houphouët and the selfish political strategies of his successors sufficient 
explanations to the shift from stability to violent conflict?  Both the choices of the 
political leaders and their “success” in provoking ethnic sentiments seem to need 
further explanation.  
4.1.3 An institutional approach  
In Crawford’s institutional approach, ethnic conflict is seen as the combined outcome 
of a historical politicization of ethnicity, the weakening of the state, and the 
exploitation of ethnic identity by political entrepreneurs. Chapter 4.1.2 has shown 
how political entrepreneurs have exploited cultural identity in Côte d’Ivoire, and how 
these strategies have destabilized the country. In this Chapter we move one step back 
and ask how this manipulation of identity has become possible: Can Crawford’s ideas 
of historical politicization of ethnicity and the weakening of the state contribute to 
our understanding of the flourishing of ethnic politics?  
The historical politicization of identity  
The institutions of the central state in post-Independence Côte d’Ivoire in general has 
not favored the politicization of ethnicity, and until the 1990s the country has had 
inclusive citizenship criteria, which according to an institutional approach would 
weaken the political relevance of cultural criteria (Crawford 1998:21). Nevertheless 
ethnicity has played a role in the political formation of the country. According to 
Tessy Bakary, the colonial powers created a simplified hierarchy between the ethnic 
groups, placing the Agni and other western/central groups at the top, above the 
Senoufo and the Dioula (north), with the Bété and other Western groups at the 
bottom. Bakary argues that this colonial construction of an “ethnic reality” 
contributed to a partition of the country opposing east and west (Bakary 1992:116). 
The formation of The African Planter’s Union, of which Félix Houphouët-Boigny 
was the president and which was the forerunner to the PDCI, marked a 
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 “baoulisation” of the Ivoirian society, meaning that the Baoulé ethnic group of the 
center was becoming economically dominant (ibid:125f).  
 
Although Houphouët was very conscious to integrate representatives of all ethnic 
groups into the political system, hence containing open ethnic conflicts, ethnic 
affiliation still played a role in the highly personalized political management of the 
country and thus held a potential to be politicized.  
A weakened state  
According to Crawford, globalization and the domestic political response of 
economic liberalization have lead to the weakening of state institutions and a 
decrease in state legitimacy in a number of countries. This weakening in turn opens 
up the space to ethnic entrepreneurs. The question is whether the emergence of 
“ethnic entrepreneurs” and their “success” in mobilizing ethnic policies in Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 1990s can be explained as a response to the state’s weakened grip on 
the society.  
 
In the first two decades after independence, the Ivorian political elite maintained a 
strong hold on power with the combined help of steady economic growth, a certain 
economic distribution and favorable external circumstances. With the economic 
recession and growing debt, coupled with stronger pressures for democratization 
from outside, the old strategies for maintaining power did no longer hold, and new 
strategies were needed. One of the simplest means of state power, namely state 
resources, which were systematically used to “buy” political support, drastically 
diminished. Accordingly, the political elite sought new ways to maintain their power, 
including increased authoritarianism. To the general public this may have been 
experienced rather as a strengthening than a weakening of the state. It was, however, 
also a manifestation that the elite was losing control and had to use increasingly 
repressive measures to keep control. This can be seen in the turbulent years around 
the transition to multipartyism under Houphouët, as well as in Bédié’s presidency.  
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 As we saw in section 3.1.3, Crawford argues that globalization and liberalization 
deprive the state of a) the possibility to uphold the social contract, through reducing 
its role in the economy, and b) the possibility to repress dissent. With the state left 
with less legitimacy and less repressive power, the space is opened up for ethnic 
entrepreneurs. The first point, namely the effect of declining policy space of the state 
due to externally induced liberalization programs, is discussed in more depth in 
Bonnie Campbell’s analyses of adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire. She describes the 
paradox that although the liberalization programs led to the halving of official cocoa 
and coffee producer prices between 1988-89 and 1989-90, political debate did not 
focus on this but on who would succeed Houphouët-Boigny. The liberalization 
programs left politicians with little choice in economic policy matters, while the 
nature of the programs themselves caused dissatisfaction, making it difficult to build 
cohesion (Campbell 2003:8). The response of the power holders was to reorient 
political debate into “ethnic politics”: While the PDCI accused the FPI of being an 
ethno-regional party with narrow local interests in mind, the FPI portrayed the PDCI 
as a “cover for domination by the President’s ethnic group, the Baoulé” (ibid.)  
 
According to Crawford, resource scarcity may tempt the political elite to privilege 
particular groups because they no longer can afford to uphold general welfare policies 
and because patronage networks as allocative mechanisms require few transaction 
costs (Crawford 1998:25). Diminishing resources would hence lead to increasing 
patronage. In Côte d’Ivoire, Bédié increasingly favored his ethnic group Baoulé – and 
did so in a more apparent and explicit way than had his predecessor Houphouët. This 
may be interpreted as a response to diminishing distributive capacity. Deprived of his 
predecessor’s possibility to “buy support” from a nation-wide constituency, he chose 
to focus on a Baoulé constituency, so that they, at least, would continue to support 
him.  
 
Crawford describes this logic for “new or fragile democracies”:  
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 “With regard to the institutions of representation in new or fragile democracies 
where resources are scarce and the legacies of ethnic machines still linger, the 
requirement for electoral support may provide more of an incentive for political 
entrepreneurs to make extremist appeals that promise more benefits to the targeted 
ethnic group than for them to make moderate appeals to a wider population.”  
                   Crawford 1998: 25 
 
Finally, the “bandwagon effect”, where ethnic politics from one political actor 
reduces the cost of ethnic policies for others and thus provokes an ethnic response 
from opponents, has also been present in Côte d’Ivoire. Bédié’s resort to Ivoirité may 
in part be explained by his need to counter the challenges of FPI’s nationalist 
strategies. Both Gueï and Gbagbo have “answered” the Ivoirité discourse, which they 
claim is an Akan project, by advancing ethnic sentiments in their own ethnic 
constituencies (Yacouba and Bété respectively, both from the west). To Alassane 
Ouattara, the strategic response to the nationalist and exclusionist policies of the 
PDCI was to focus maximally on the ethnic aspect (“I am excluded because I am a 
northerner/a Muslim”) and build his support on the image of a victim of exclusion 
rather than on a political program.  
The decline of the neo-patrimonial state 
In this perspective, political crisis results from a crisis of legitimacy following the 
collapse of the neo-patrimonial distribution model. Thus, the “success” of the Ivorian 
model is attributable not only to the authoritarian governance of Houphouët-Boigny 
and his support from the French, but also to his ability to create support based on a 
selective redistribution of resources. However, with the economic crisis that deprived 
the state of resources, coupled with reform policies that denounced neo-patrimonial 
practices as corrupt, this mode of redistribution was put under attack. The patrimonial 
source of legitimation was thus removed without being replaced by other adequate 
sources of legitimation.  
 
Houphouët-Boigny’s rule has often been described as a typical example of neo-
patrimonial rule, where modern bureaucratic institutions are combined with the use of 
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 patron-client relations ensuring the control of the personal ruler (Crook1989:206). 
Through different strategies, Houphouët used the state’s economic resources to 
secure his political support. An expansion of the public sector served the need for 
control and made possible the alliance-building and the cooptation of potential 
political opponents needed to maintain the total authority of the ruler.  
 
Accounts of the decline of the neo-patrimonial state leading to warlordism, as well as 
related descriptions of the criminalization of the state (Braathen et.al. 2000, Reno 
1998, Bayart et.al 1999) typically use as examples countries very different from Côte 
d’Ivoire, like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Congo, where conflicts have been spurred by 
the rivalry over natural resources (mainly minerals and oil) and warlords building 
their political power on control over these resources. Moreover, political institutions 
in Côte d’Ivoire are relatively well developed and have not been subject to the total 
“state collapse” described by Reno (Reno 1998:1). These explanations should thus 
not be uncritically transferred to the Ivorian case, where conflict dynamics have been 
different. However, the perspective of the neo-patrimonial state does shed light on the 
legitimacy and governance crisis of the Ivorian state, where liberal reforms have 
attacked the old platform of legitimacy, opening the way to destabilization and 
conflict.  
4.1.4 Summing up: Is the Ivorian conflict an ethnic conflict?  
Instrumental perspectives on ethnicity can be useful in highlighting how identities 
related to history, community, and religion have been tactically used and manipulated 
for purposes of personal and political gain. An important contribution of the 
Instrumentalist school is the recognition that ethnic identity is not naturally given but 
rather formed by historical and political processes –some of which may be quite 
recent. In this sense, the south-north division that is now becoming more and more of 
a political reality in Côte d’Ivoire is a political construct created by the Ivoirité 
discourse and the simplistic discourse of Ouattara’s supporters. Each of the two 
groups are composed of very different ethnic groups and have not seen themselves as 
part of the “north” or the “south” until quite recently.  
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 The shortcoming of instrumentalist perspectives, however, is that they tend to ignore 
the importance of other identities than ethnic identities, and hence to underestimate 
the effect that economic and political factors may have on conflict, independently of 
ethnic politics. Hence, Chapter 4.2 shows how generations (in the forest zone) and the 
student community (in the cities) have been major non-ethnic identities through 
which conflict has been provoked.  
 
Institutional perspectives on ethnicity are better equipped to grasp the complexity of 
conflict because they consider how economics, politics, and ethnicity interact. Thus 
the Ivorian conflict can be seen as the combined effect of a weakening of the state 
due to economic crisis, externally-imposed reforms and liberalization and ethnic 
manipulation by elites.  
4.2 Economic Causes of Conflict?  
The second group of explanations of conflict consists of economic explanations. Is 
conflict the result of dramatic changes in growth patterns and in people’s living 
conditions? Can the flourishing of political violence in Côte d’Ivoire be interpreted as 
an outcome of the economic crisis?  
 
We will approach these questions by applying the theory of relative deprivation to 
political developments central to today’s conflict.  
 
Recalling Gurr’s theory, presented in Chapter 3, relative deprivation can be induced 
by one out of three developments; namely decremental deprivation, where conditions 
worsen; aspirational deprivation, where expectations rise and conditions remain 
constant; or progressive deprivation, where a period of economic development is 
followed by sharp reversal (corresponding to Davies’ J-curve).   
 
The first part of the chapter deals with general trends of growth, poverty, and 
inequality. In the following two sections we have chosen to look further into two 
groups that were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis, and who reacted 
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 violently; namely the students and the population of the forest zone. These two 
groups are the two groups where the militant nationalism is strongest today.  
4.2.1 A miracle economy in crisis  
As noted in Chapter 3.2.2, there is evidence of the statistical relation between 
economic development and violent conflict. Paul Collier et al, in their extensive 
quantitative study of civil wars, identify the “failure of economic development” as the 
key root cause of conflict (Collier et.al 2003). Obviously, however, poor countries are 
not doomed to conflict. Côte d’Ivoire, although among the world’s poorest states, is 
richer than most of its neighbors, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, none of 
which have experienced violent conflict in the last decade. If we seek an explanation 
of the outbreak of violent conflict in Côte d’Ivoire in economic factors, we first need 
to take a closer look at actual economic changes, including changes in resource 
distribution and how economic changes have affected different groups. Secondly, we 
must examine the political repercussions of these changes.  
Economic changes: Côte d’Ivoire in a comparative perspective 
To put economic developments in Côte d’Ivoire in a comparative perspective, we 
have chosen to compare changes over the last 25 years in a number of African 
countries on some essential indicators. The development in economic growth is 
identified to show how the economic situation in the country has changed, in 
comparison with other countries. Furthermore, we look at trends in poverty. More 
than comparing the countries on actual levels of economic growth or poverty, we are 
interested in comparing the countries’ changes over time on these indicators.  
 
Figure 2 shows the Average Annual Growth Rate for six selected African countries.  
Côte d’Ivoire had an average growth rate of 8% in the years 1960-1970; while for the 
years 1980-1990 the rate had dropped to 0,9 (Figure 2.) Although all our selected 
countries except Senegal experienced reduced growth over these two decades, in 
none of the other cases is the deterioration as severe as for Côte d’Ivoire. The fall in 
the growth rate was particularly sharp from the 1970s to the 1980s. The reduced 
growth levels reflects the deteriorating terms of trade for primary commodities and a 
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 growing debt crisis which hit most African countries in the 1980s. The figure 
suggests that Côte d’Ivoire was harder hit than other countries by this crisis.  
 
For the years 1990-1997, on the other hand, Côte d’Ivoire saw a return to a relatively 
high growth rate (3%), unlike the other countries. This probably reflects a positive 
development of cocoa and coffee prices in the period, as well as effects of the 1994 
devaluation of the CFA Franc. The growth rate fell sharply again, however, in 2001-
2002, again untypical among our selected countries, which in general experienced 
stabilization or increase of growth. The rate for 2001-2001 is unlikely to be affected 
by the September 2002 rebellion, but is, on the other hand, likely to be influenced by  
general economic uncertainties after the 1999 coup d’état.  
 
Figure 2: Development of GDP growth in six African countries, 1960-2002  
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 Figure 3 shows the development of extreme poverty, defined as the percentage of the 
population living on under 1$ a day18, for the same countries.  
 
We see that Côte d’Ivoire started off with very low absolute poverty in 1981, lowest 
among the six countries. Extreme poverty rose, however, to 11% in 1990 and 20% in 
1999. While Côte d’Ivoire has significantly less extreme poverty than most of the 
other countries throughout the period, the steady increase in extreme poverty is 
dramatic. Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that the increase in extreme poverty is 
accompanied by a general rise in poverty, even for groups who come above the one 
dollar a day limit.19
 
The gradual rise in poverty shown by the figure is compatible with the theoretical 
notion of decremental deprivation, where conditions deteriorate over time. According 
to the theory, such a development creates frustration and may give rise to rebellion. 
One should of course not interpret this mechanically, for example by interpreting the 
rebellion in 2002 as a direct consequence of rising poverty. However, a dramatic 
increase in poverty over time may have given rise to protests and a growing level of 
social discontent, decreasing the trust in policymakers and increasing the general 
level of tension in the country. 
 
The increase of poverty moreover meant that poverty spread to areas not previously 
hit by it. The increase was particularly high in the cities and in the West Forest 
(Kayizzi-Mugerwa:5). While the areas with the highest poverty are rural (particularly 
the Savannah in the northern part of the country, the increase in poverty has been 
higher in urban than in rural areas. The increase in poverty has been particularly 
marked in Abidjan, rising from 0.7% in 1985 to 5.1% in 1993, 20.2% in 1995, before 
declining to 11.1% in 1998 (UNECA 2005). Michael Grimm et.al found that average 
real monthly wages of civil servants fell by 44% in Abidjan and 56% in other urban 
 
18 The one dollar a day standard is an international measure of extreme poverty used by the World Bank and other 
institutions. The poverty line is measured in 1993 international prices and adjusted to local currency using purchasing 
power parities (PPPs)  
19 Statistics that show the development of the two dollar a day-poverty line over the period are not available   
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 centers from 1985 to 1995 (Grimm et.al 2001:8). They further found a strong 
increasing poverty trend in urban areas in the same period, then a weak declining 
poverty trend after 1995 (ibid.) Inequality also rose in the same period: In Abidjan the 
Gini coefficient increased from 0.34 in 1985 to 0.44 in 1995, dropping to 0.38 in 
1998 (ibid).Rising poverty in urban areas may be more politically destabilizing than 
in other areas because urban dwellers are more exposed to wealth and have more 
political resources.  
 
Figure 3: Development of extreme poverty in six African countries, 1981-2001   
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It seems plausible to apply a combined perspective of decremental and progressive 
deprivation on developments in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s. On the one hand, the real 
depreciation of economic conditions was significant, causing increased poverty and 
harshened living conditions. On the other hand, this depreciation happened after two 
decades of fast and steady growth, having created the expectation of further growth. 
People in Côte d’Ivoire had learned to see themselves as better off than other 
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 Africans. There existed a pride in the “Ivoirian Miracle” and a stated expectation, 
both from the country’s own elite and from the outside world (particularly the 
French) that Côte d’Ivoire would continue to prosper. This expectation made the 
sudden deterioration even harder on the population, and even more politically 
explosive.  
 
Figure 3 shows a particularly sharp increase in poverty from 1987 to 1990. For the 
period 1985-1988, Grootaert has found that per capita household expenditures fell by 
almost 30% (Grootaert 1993:1524). The growing political tension and violence from 
1989 should be understood on the background of these developments.  
 
The effects of general negative economic trends were aggravated by policy measures 
with sudden and far-reaching effects. These were related to the culmination of the 
economic crisis and the following increased role of the International Financial 
Institutions from 1989 onward.  
 
By 1989 the public sector deficit had reached unprecedented levels, whereas the 
foreign debt was rising. The need for reform was evident, and the World Bank and 
the IMF demanded drastic measures. While the Ivorian government up until then to a 
certain degree had been able to resist and manipulate the adjustment policies, now the 
leverage of the IFIs increased and Houphouët had to accept dramatic measures. The 
Price stabilization fund was running large deficits, and the Ivorian government finally 
gave in to World Bank and the IMF demands that the price guarantee be abandoned, 
causing a price drop of cocoa and coffee of 50 percent. Early in 1990, public and 
private sector salaries were cut by 20%, and the University teachers’ salary by 50% 
(N’Da 1999: 65-67).  
 
In the following years the government led an unprecedented austerity policy to reduce 
their budget deficits. Public enterprises were dissolved, throwing former workers into 
unemployment (Jarret and Mahieu 2002:24). Jarret and Mahieu argue that the 
growing unemployment had a negative effect on the state’s economic results, 
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 contributing to its inability to repay debts. Not surprisingly, the unemployment also 
led to rising social tensions (ibid.). In order to be able to pay its debts, the state 
reduced spending, particularly in the fields of health, education and housing (ibid.) 
Jarret and Mahieu further note a movement from the formal to the informal sector, as 
people whose enterprises failed moved into the informal sector. 
 
In the same period, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and private loans towards Côte 
d’Ivoire diminished, whereas official loans as well as aid increased, leading to a 
heavier dependence of the state on the IFIs. 
 
In conclusion, Côte d’Ivoire at the start of the 1990s found itself in a deep economic 
crisis that questioned the whole idea of the “Ivoirian miracle”. Poverty and 
unemployment were rising and created frustration, and the PDCI regime was losing 
its economic means of governance and faced a legitimacy crisis. As the IFIs became 
more directly involved in policymaking, it became harder for the government to 
maintain a public perception that they were in control.  
 
The rising nationalism should be interpreted in light of this economic and political 
crisis. At the elite level, the recourse to Ivoirié has been interpreted as a strategy to 
avoid economic discussion in a situation of crisis (see 4.1.3). On the popular level, 
poverty, as well as “relative deprivation”, may create the need for scapegoats. To 
investigate the last point, we have chosen to take a closer look at two groups who 
were hard hit by the economic crisis and reforms, and who reacted violently.  
 
First, we will take a closer look at dynamics in the forest zone, where depletion of 
resources as well as liberalization policies affected both local and immigrant 
populations and spurred latent conflicts between them. Secondly, we will look at the 
students, a previously privileged group who was hard hit by economic reforms and 
who reacted violently.  
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 4.2.2 The land question  
The question of the right to land is one of the most disputed issues in Ivorian politics 
today. The Rural Land Law, passed by the Bédié government in 1998 but equally 
welcomed by the opposition (Chauveau 2000:2f), reserves rural land ownership to 
Ivorian citizens. Following this Law conflicts in rural areas of Western Côte d’Ivoire 
intensified, leading to the evacuation of thousands of Burkinabè from the south west 
of the country (ibid.).  
 
Under the “houphouëtian system” the income of cocoa and coffee producers were 
regulated through the Price Stabilization Fund, which saved exports income in times 
of high world prizes and draw on these resources when prices sank. The producers 
were hence protected from fluctuations in world prices and enjoyed a guaranteed 
price for their products. However, as cocoa and coffee prices plunged in the 1980s, 
this stabilization policy was no longer sustainable as the Stabilization Fund was 
depleted of funds.  In 1989 the government accepted the IMF demand of 
liberalization of prices paid to producers, and coffee and cocoa prices paid to 
producers were halved. Other agricultural support policies were also abandoned.  
 
The economic crisis caused important changes in the social and political conditions in 
the rural areas, not least in the forest zone of the country, the area of most of the 
country’s cocoa and coffee production. The area has been a receiver of successive 
movements of immigration since colonial times. In the 1930s, the colonial authorities 
encouraged the settlement of people from Upper Volta in the Center West of Côte 
d’Ivoire to develop coffee and cocoa production for export (Chauveau 2000:4). As 
immigration increased, settlers moved west through the forest region in a “pioneering 
front” (ibid.). After Independence, the government led a systematic policy of 
developing forest-based cash crops in the west and south-west, and migration 
increased further (ibid.) Conflicts over land rights between “natives” of the west on 
the one hand and Baoulé as well as foreign immigrants on the other have been 
frequent in the area, where the government has typically taken the side of the 
immigrants. Up to the 1990s these conflicts were contained by political compromises, 
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 but from the 1990s violent conflict intensified dramatically, as part of the general 
rising level of tensions in the country.  
 
Chauveau describes the rural crisis as consisting of three components; the crisis of the 
pioneer model of production, a crisis of governance (or what he calls 
“governmentalité” to distinguish it from the more politically charged “gouvernance”), 
and finally, and partly springing out of the other two, generational tensions 
(Chauveau 2003:1f). The following outline of these three conflict components is 
based on Chauveau (2000) and Chauveau (2003).  
The crisis of the pioneer model of production  
The “pioneer model” of agricultural production was based on a number of favorable 
conditions such as easy access to labor through immigration, modest needs of capital, 
state support in the forms of subsidies, credit etc, and a general policy favoring rural 
development, for example through the Stabilization Fund (Caistab), and through 
encouragement of migration towards the forests zones. The necessary funds were 
provided through indirect taxation of agricultural production through the Caistab, 
through international aid, and through debt. But beyond these economic factors the 
system also relied on a set of informal institutional mechanisms, based largely on 
informal relations and patterns of influence. These mechanisms served to uphold 
traditional law and undermine formal law, according to which “the land belonged to 
those who cultivated it”. Informal institutions, supported by the state, thus balanced 
the relationship between “autochtones” and “allogènes”, admitting more rights to the 
“autochtones” than did formal legislation.  
 
One of these institutions was the traditional institution of “tutorat” (guardianship) 
between local people and migrants, where the recipient of a land loan or “sale” 
maintains a permanent debt of gratitude towards his “guardian” who becomes his 
“patron”, even if the newcomer is far richer (Chauveau 2000:11). Guardianship 
passes down from generation to generation and involves the financial support for 
funerals, assistance in times of financial hardships, etc. According to Chauveau, the 
tutorat was instrumentalized by the state to persuade local authorities to receive 
 74
 immigrants from the Center and the North of Côte d’Ivoire and from the neighboring 
countries.  
 
This model of exploitation of forest resources successful in 1960s and 1970s, but it 
was based upon presumptions that made it fragile to the structural changes that 
occurred in the following decades.  
 
The liberalization policies in the rural areas included a massive and brutal abandoning 
of agricultural support policies (Chauveau 2003:7). We have seen that the cocoa and 
coffee prices were halved in 1989. In Chauveau’s view, the economic crisis in the 
forest zone contributed to making visible the relative success of the migrants, thereby 
highlighting the question of land occupation by foreigners. This led to the 
stigmatization of the migrants, and particularly of the Burkinabè, as scapegoats of the 
rural crisis.  
The rural governance crisis 
Chauveau argues that during the 1960s and 1970s, the abundance of resources led to 
what Mamdani calls “Decentralized Despotism” (Mamdani 1996).  
 
Governance in the rural area depended on a clientelist network of “political agents”, 
or middlemen between the central authorities and the rural population. These 
middlemen could be party officials, traditional chiefs, or representatives of “resident 
organizations”, which organized people of the same cultural community. They 
implemented stated policies and simultaneously secured the local anchoring of the 
state – and they profited materially, politically, and symbolically on their role as 
middlemen. Their political and economic situation thus depended on their position in 
the state/party, which again depended on their presumed representativity in their 
community. But their representativity in the community again relied upon the social 
capital that they possessed locally, and their social capital depended on their ability to 
mobilize state resources.  
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 The legitimacy of this “clientelist circle” was assured by the redistribution of 
abundant resources, generated from an accelerated exploitation of forest resources 
with the support of the international financial institutions.  
 
Chauveau further argues that there existed a “historical compromise” which regulated 
the conflicts around the right to land. In exchange for price and sales guarantees, as 
well as rural development policies in general, the rural population provided total 
support for the one party state and its agents, and for the agents’ extraction of rents 
from the agricultural production. One component of this compromise involved the 
immigrants in particular, who benefited from a protected access to land in exchange 
for electoral support. However, the compromise also included young people in the 
rural areas who benefited from education and help to establish themselves as 
agriculturalists.  
 
The economic crisis naturally led to a crisis of this system of governance, since the 
system so directly relied on economic resources. With land resources diminishing 
simultaneously with state resources, the redistribution of political and agricultural 
resources met local resistance. As land resources diminished, the “autochtones” 
started to question the state’s protection of immigrants’ rights to land, especially of 
the Baoulé immigrants, as both presidents Houphouët and Bédié were accused of 
unjustly favoring their own ethnic group.  
 
The reduction of resources to distribute pushed the local agents of the state to play the 
ethnic card in order to secure their own position. This reduced their legitimacy and 
thus the legitimacy of the entire political system.  
 
The legitimacy crisis resulting from the diminishing of public resources to distribute 
did not lead to the search for an alternative to the clientelist regime. The political 
competition for control over diminishing resources on the contrary came to provoke 
regionalist and ethnic policies around the question of citizenship.  
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 It is on this background of decline in legitimacy that we must interpret the legislative 
measures that were taken in field of land from the end of the 1980s. As the state lost 
legitimacy at the local level the success of public interventions could no longer rely 
on political compromises like it had done in the 1960s and 1970s, and the state opted 
instead for legislative reforms, negotiated within the political class. From 1989-90 the 
Rural Land Plan was launched, which aimed to secure rights that had previously been 
obtained because of tradition. In the Rural Land Law of 1998 Bédié clearly 
denounced the houphouëtian principle of “the land belongs to those who cultivate it” 
and restricted the right to acquire land to citizens.  
Generational tensions 
The economic crisis in urban areas, including vast youth unemployment, also had 
repercussions in the rural areas. The 1980s saw a substantial “return movement” to 
the countryside, especially of young people. These were rural youth who had studied 
or tried to make a living in the cities, and who returned because of difficulties in 
finding employment in the cities. Even urban youth whose parents had migrants from 
rural areas to the cities “returned” to their area of origin to try to make a living.  
These people often ended up in conflict with the original population, even of their 
own families, who were not always willing to sell them land, and often preferred to 
rent or “sell” land to immigrants. These young people, having been exposed to wealth 
in the cities without being able to succeed there, had high expectations at their return, 
and experienced as particularly unjust that they were denied access to the land of their 
ancestors. The generational tensions also spurred inter-group tensions as the young 
returnees often directed their frustration at the immigrants. Young immigrants, on the 
other hand, simultaneously became a vulnerable group as the traditional land rights, 
which had secured the land rights of their parents, were threatened.   
The land question: A case of relative deprivation?  
The “crisis of the pioneer model of production”, which can be called the economic 
aspect of the crisis, illustrates a case of decremental deprivation, where conditions 
worsen for the majority of the population. Instead of directing their discontent against 
political authorities (as would be predicted by Gurr), the local population targeted the 
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 immigrant population, with whom relations had been tense for a time. The 
“governance crisis”, on the other hand, points to a political aspect of the crisis, and 
shows that economic explanations can not be used in a deterministic way. The 
economic and political aspects of the rurality crisis are, however, intimately linked, 
and it is the resource scarcity that leads to the crisis of the governance model.  
 
The generational crisis may be interpreted in the light of aspirational deprivation. 
Young people who had been living in the city had been exposed to the wealth and 
opportunities of the city, while both the student life and the studies themselves may 
have provided them with great expectations for the future. They were then met with a 
double disappointment: first, of unemployment, then of the denied access to land 
upon returning to their home areas. It is the frustration created by this kind of gap 
between expectations and reality, more than poverty in itself, that gives rise to 
violence.  
4.2.3 Student mobilization 
The students, together with the Univeristy teachers, were probably the one group 
hardest hit by the economic reforms. A privileged group in the 1970s and early 
1980s, the students experienced a sudden and dramatic deterioration of studying and 
living conditions. Study grants, free housing and transport facilities were abolished. 
At the same time the educational quality was threatened as teachers’ salaries were 
halved over-night (Messou) and general spending on higher education was neglected 
as a result of the economic crisis. Evidently, such a dramatic deterioration of 
students’ conditions provoked vehement protest. But the students, more than 
campaigning narrowly for their own group interests, saw their struggle as part of a 
wider democratic struggle against the PDCI regime and against the harsh economic 
reforms imposed upon the country by the IMF and the World Bank, with the 
collaboration of the sitting regime. The universities became the main arena for 
development of violent opposition to the PDCI regime and the single party system, 
where students worked together with the Teachers’ Union Synares led by Laruent 
Gbagbo, and later with the FPI.  
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 The Fesci (Féderation Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire) was created in 1991 
as a federation of several student organizations, and soon became an all-dominating 
movement on campus. While some former Fesci activists claim that the organization 
worked independently of political partis for students’ interests, cooperating with 
several opposition parties (Moussa 2004: interview), the dominating view among 
analysts as well as those involved in the movement at the time, seems to be that it was 
intimately linked to the biggest opposition party. (Kouassi Yao 2004: interview; 
Konaté 2003) In he words of Kouassi Yao, sociologist at the Universtiy of Abidjan:  
 
“[FESCI] was the secular branch of those who are today in power… They 
instrumentalized the youth, all the school and university students, for a political 
purpose.” 
(Kouassi Yao 2004: Interview)    
 
Konaté Sidiki, today spokesperson for the New Forces (the rebellion), active in 
FESCI at the time, denies the direct affiliation to the FPI, but emphasizes that all the 
opposition movements worked together:  
 
“So you had the oppositional block against the dignitaries of the ancient system; the 
PDCI against the other political parties: the FPI, the PIT, the USD, and… four big 
parties. And the FESCI of course. So we led the same battle. With the other 
organizations. In ’90, we even took to the streets to support the candidacy of Mr. 
Laurent Gbagbo, today President of Côte d’Ivoire. It’s important to understand. 
Because we had the same platform of demands.” 
       (Konaté Sidiki 2004: Interview)      
 
Whether one sees the student movement as cynically used by Gbagbo for his own 
political ambitions or as an independent political force, however, it is clear that the 
students themselves identified with a political and social struggle which would 
succeed through the election of a government of the left which would improve the 
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 conditions not only for the students but for the whole population. The students’ 
struggle became, however, in an exceptional way marked by violence. 
History of the Fesci  
At the time when Fesci was created, the University of Abidjan had been closed to any 
real ideological debate since 1982 (Konaté 2003:51). Before that, there had existed a 
certain freedom of expression and real ideological debate between people close to the 
PDCI and others who later became central to the FPI (among them Laurent Gbagbo).  
 
In February 1982 a planned public meeting opposing Gbagbo and Bernard Zadi 
(USD) on the one side and Djédjé Mady and Jean-Jaques Béchio (both PDCI) on the 
other, was banned in the last hour, and massive student protest and police repression 
followed. The PDCI blamed the problems on ethnicity, speaking of a “Bété complot” 
by Gbagbo, Zadi, and Pierre Kipré, president of Synares who had criticized the 
police’s illegal interference at campus. After this event Gbagbo went into exile in 
France (ibid). The only political student organization was the Meeci, student branch 
of the PDCI, but towards the end of the 1980s the Meeci was increasingly being 
challenged by emerging radical student movements. Following multipartyism, Meeci 
was dissolved, and Fesci officially tolerated, but counteracted by the regime by the 
presence of “loubards” (“mobs” who worked for the government at campus) (N’Da 
1999: 75-76).  
 
The violent interruption by a group of loubards of a Fesci organized meeting – and 
the non-interferrence of the police forces present – preceded a series of violent 
clashes between the students and the police culminating in the events at Yopougon 
Students’ Residence in May 1991. The following month, one of the loubard leaders, 
Thierry Zebié, was beaten to death by the students (ibid:76 ff.)   
 
Fesci increasingly took control over different aspects of life at Campus. Using 
slingshots and home-made pepper-grenades, they ordered students to leave 
classrooms when they organized strikes, and left little space for those who did not 
agree to their policies (Konaté:2003). In June 1991 Fesci was banned, and the 
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 General Secretary Martial Ahipeaud thrown in prison. The organization thus operated 
clandestinely for three years, until 1994 (N’Da 1999, Sidiki 2004). This may well 
have contributed further to their radicalization and increasing use of violence.  
  
According to Konaté Sidiki, Fesci was less afraid to take courageous positions 
against the government than were the political parties, because the students, unlike 
members of the opposition parties, who were often civil servants and afraid of 
sanctions, the students had nothing to lose (Sidiki 2004).Yakouba Konaté emphasizes 
the unity of the students as opposed to the parties of the left, who were often lost in 
leadership quarrels (Konaté 2003:52). Fesci thus had a leading role in the opposition, 
while clearly they enjoyed the support of prominent people of the older generation, 
like Synares Presdient Marcel Etté, FPI President Gbagbo, and PTI President Francis 
Wodié.   
 
Other former militants, however, charge the FPI of having tactically infiltrated the 
student movement and manipulated the students’ struggle to their own gain. Jean Blé 
Guirao, Fesci president 1995-96 and now leader of the youth of UDPCI20, claims that 
from 1998, when Blé Goudé took over the presidency from Guillaume Soro, the 
movement was manipulated by Gbagbo to make it “a movement at the service of the 
FPI.” The movement left its practice of organizational democracy and became totally 
dominated from above. He also feels betrayed by the university teachers (among 
them Gbagbo) who he saw as allies and mentors of the students from the beginning of 
the 90s. 
 
“In the same way that Gbagbo stole my youth, Synares stole it too.”  
       Jean Blé Guirao 2004: Interview 
Student mobilization and civil war 
Can today’s conflict be traced to the culture of violence developed in the student 
milieu in the early 90s, in conditions of sudden social deterioration, ideological 
 
20 Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire, created in 2001by supporters of General Robert Gueï   
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 struggle, and political oppression? The majority of the Fesci activists have not quit 
doing politics, but we find them today in most of the political movements, form the 
New Forces, to the RDR, and, most importantly, in the Young Patriots and other pro-
government militia movements issued directly from the Fesci.  
 
Scholars like Yakouba Konaté are among those who have argued that the crisis 
starting in September 2002 has revealed the political role of the youth and in 
particular the Universtiy students. According to him, the rebellion and the ultra-
nationalism responding to it can both be seen as parts of a culture of violence 
prevalent at the University since 1991 (Konaté 2003:49). The leadership of the 
rebellion and the militia both consist largely of former Fesci activists. Soro 
Guillaume, leader of the MPCI21 and the New Forces, was president of Fesci from 
1995 to 1998. He was succeeded by Blé Goudé, (Fesci President from 1998 to 2001), 
who is now heading the Congress of Young Patriots, leading among the militia 
movements. Fesci President in an intermediary period in 1994-1995, Eugène Djué, is 
leading the Movement for Total Liberation of Côte d’Ivoire, another of the militia 
movements, and Touré Moussa Zéguen, Secretary General of the militia movement 
Groupement des patriotes pour la paix (GPP) is likewise issued from the same 
milieu. Konaté Sidiki, spokesperson for the New Forces, was also active in Fesci. 
Student violence: A case of relative deprivation?  
One of the reasons that the students became subject to the most severe budget cuts, 
was of course that they were a particularly privileged group at the outset. One might 
argue that it was only fair that they, for example, instead of having their own, free, 
transport system, should take the public bus like everybody else. Even though other 
measures were more serious, one could probably argue that the students, even after 
the cuts, were better off than most of the population. Relative deprivation is, 
however, about the discrepancy between what a group is capable of attaining and 
what they see themselves as “justifiably entitled to” (Gurr 1975: 25). It does not seem 
 
21 Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire, one of the militia movements  
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 strange that the sudden removal of privileges of the sort the Ivorian students 
experienced in the early 1990s provoked the feeling of deception, especially as they 
were being harder hit than any other group. Adding to the feeling of deprivation was, 
of course, the brutality the students were met with when they protested. The students’ 
situation can be interpreted as a combination of aspirational and progressive 
deprivation. On the one hand, the students were a group with expectations for the 
future, which were suddenly being threatened. On the other hand, their current living 
standard was drastically deteriorating, corresponding to a situation of progressive 
deprivation.  
4.3 Economic Reform and Political Protest  
The privatization program launched in 1990 envisaged the privatization of about 60 
state-owned firms, then about 75% of the public sector in terms of turnover, jobs, and 
value added. They included transport, food processing, telecommunications, energy, 
banks, publishing, tourism, public works and mining companies (AfDB/OECD 
2004:116). The privatization processes have given rise to much contestation and 
allegations of corruption and patronage in the sales process. Sales to French 
companies have been particularly unpopular. Bruno Losch points out that although 
the cocoa sector, the strategic sector of the Ivorian economy, is dominated by 
American or European companies; it is the French who are targeted by nationalist 
reactions, particularly Bouygues and Bolloré (Losch 2003:54).22 The symbolism of 
ownership by companies from the former colonial power is strong. Moreover, Losch 
indicates that the antagonism towards these two companies is attributable to the fact 
that they profited from privatizations when Ouattara was Prime Minister (ibid.). At 
the time, Bédié led a campaign against these privatizations. 
 
The cocoa and coffee sector was gradually liberalized during the 1990s until the total 
liberalization in 1999 when the Price Stabilization Fund was dismantled. The 
abandonment of support policies in 1989 led to the halving of prices and caused 
 
22 Bouygues owns the water and electricity enterprises, whereas Bolloré dominates transports and industrial plantations.  
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 increased poverty in cocoa- and coffee-growing areas, leading to the inter-group 
tensions described in Chapter 4.5.2. Cocoa- and coffee growers’ income increased 
temporarily after the devaluation in 1994, but in 1999 prices again fell, coinciding 
with the final dismantlement of Caistab. The farmers were left extremely vulnerable 
and exposed to price fluctuations (International Labor Rights Fund, undated:5) 
According to the International Cocoa Organization, buyers sometimes pays way 
below official prices, and cocoa farmers, often illiterate small farmers who are poorly 
organized, are ill equipped to negotiate prices (International Cocoa Organization 
2003:3). The liberalization of the sector also led to the consolidation among the cocoa 
traders, so that three major cocoa processors now dominate the market and together 
transform over 50% of the country’s crop (ibid.)  
 
Bruno Losch argues that before the final dismantlement of the Caistab, there emerged 
an oligopoly of firms, in alliance with foreign companies, which were supported by 
Bédié to counter the threat that liberalization posed to the state. The concentration of 
power that resulted led to a rapid increase in poverty and inequality (Losh 2000:12f).  
 
The 50% devaluation of the CFA Franc was decided on January 11 1994, only a 
month after the death of Houphouët, who had vehemently opposed this measure long 
advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. Although Prime Minister Daniel Kablan 
Duncan defended the measure as necessary to reverse the negative economic trends in 
Côte d’Ivoire and the other countries of the UEMOA, it was clear to most people that 
the devaluation was imposed by the international financial institutions (N’Da 
1999:115f). The effects of the devaluation were ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
economy seemed to recover in the years following the devaluation: export incomes 
rose, the country’s terms of trade improved significantly, and the budget deficit was 
reduced from 11.9% of GDP in 1993 to 6.5% in 1994 and 1.8% in 1998 (Garandeau 
2002:5). In the short term, however, devaluation had some negative impact, 
especially in urban areas, as the prices of foreign purchases doubled, leading to 
budget strains as well as increased poverty in the cities (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001:5). 
Corbin Guedegbe describes how the devaluation exacerbated the crisis of the 
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 education system in the CFA countries, as education material became more expensive 
and the conditions of the staff tougher, forcing many to take external jobs in addition 
to teaching (Guedegbe 2002:4). In the Ivoirian cities, the cheap labor from 
neighboring countries departed, as their earnings were halved with the devaluation. 
Coupled with the sudden departure of French, this had negative short-term effects on 
urban welfare, and caused protest (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001:5).  
 
Urban poverty has risen proportionally more than rural poverty in the 1980s and 
1990s. In the mid-80s poverty was mainly a rural problem, but urban dwellers have 
largely had to pay the price for budget cuts and restructurings linked to adjustment, 
and urban poverty has risen. At the same time, it has been increasingly difficult for 
youth graduating from University to find jobs in the civil service, as the number of 
graduates have risen in parallel with cutbacks in the civil service. Poverty, 
unemployment and a general decrease in living standards give rise to frustration and 
may spur political violence. In Côte d’Ivoire, this frustration, which initially was 
turned against the party in power (PDCI) and the IFIs, has been instrumentalized by 
the party in power and turned against the country’s immigrants. There is, however, a 
link between on the one hand the “anti-imperialist” nationalism, directed at the IFIs, 
France, and the PDCI, perceived to be agents of these external actors, and on the 
other hand the current xenophobic nationalism. The role of Alassane Ouattara is the 
perfect illustration of the “two types” of nationalism and the way they have become 
mixed.  
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 5. Major Findings and Conclusions   
Political debate in –and on– Côte d’Ivoire is so dominated by personality struggles 
and “la politique politicienne” that it may seem like the conflict is all about a struggle 
over power between the major actors in the political elite and their strategies to 
manipulate the population. Yet while elite strategies have indeed played a major role 
for the evolution of conflict, people are not puppets who can simply be manipulated 
at will by their political leaders. We have tried to show how changes in the economic 
situation of the country have shaped elite strategies, and equally important how 
changes in people’s living conditions have affected political action in the population. 
Neither a purely elite-based approach nor a pure structural approach based on 
changes in material conditions can alone provide sufficient explanations of political 
breakdown. However, by identifying major economic changes and looking at political 
responses to them, we can come closer to an understanding of the relationship 
between economic change and political developments. 
 
None of the three post-Houphouët leaders has achieved the political legitimacy 
needed to create a functioning democracy and political stability. The political 
destabilization in Côte d’Ivoire was triggered by the death of the “Father of the 
nation”, but also happened in parallel with serious economic problems and growing 
poverty. In fact, the political destabilization was under way even in Houphoüet’s 
time, the announcing of multiparty elections being a clear sign of the weakening of 
the president, who had refused this option only months before.   
 
While the economic upswing following the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 
provided Bédié with a certain legitimacy in the first years of his presidency, he was 
weakened by corruption scandals, negative growth trends since 1998, as well as 
growing criticism of his nationalistic profile. Robert Gueï enjoyed a certain 
popularity in the months following the coup d’état in December 1999, but 
disappointed many as he did not live up to his promises of breaking with Ivoirité and 
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 putting an end to corruption, and as he, contrary to his promises, posed himself as 
presidential candidate. Gbagbo abandoned his position as leader of the broader 
opposition movement of the left already in 1995 when he joined the Republican 
Front, and has further delegitimized himself by his strong anti-foreign policies. 
Gbagbo is probably the one who has been most “successful” in mobilizing political 
support on a nationalistic political program. In doing this, however, he has not only 
delegitimized himself in the eyes of other parts of the population and heightened the 
tensions; he has also chosen to base his support almost entirely on nationalistic 
policies and turned away former political allies in the democratic movement.   
 
The political choices of the three post-Houphouët leaders have brought national 
identity to the front of the political scene. This has delegitimized the leaders 
themselves and the entire political system in the view of those excluded, but it has 
also turned political debate away from other political issues of major importance to 
the population, such as economic development, poverty, and corruption, a 
development which may further delegitimize the political system. On this last point, 
Alassane Outtara, the fourth major political personality of the country, who has not 
yet succeeded to become president, has chosen the same political focus although from 
a different position.  
 
We have analyzed these political strategies in the light of economic developments 
and reforms. In the following we will summarize how economic reforms have 
contributed to shaping elite strategies as well as political responses from the 
opposition and the public.  
5.1 Political Consequences of Economic Reform 
During the first decade of adjustment, where focus was on macroeconomic reform, 
the programs had few visible political implications. Towards the end of the decade, 
however, tensions grew as the World Bank and the IMF demanded drastic reforms 
that directly affected the lives of people.  
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 First, the policies of austerity put forward by the financial institutions favored the 
introduction to multipartyism, because their effects were so unbearable on the 
population that they provoked an unprecedented pressure for change. While the effect 
of political liberalization in itself is judged by most as positive, however, political 
analysts and political actors alike tend to describe these events as destabilizing in the 
total. When talking about the transition to multipartyism, none of the political actors 
or analysts interviewed used the words “democracy” or “democratization”, and they 
tended to describe these developments as more negative than positive (Nyamien 
Messou N’Guessan 2004, interview, Venance Konan, 2004, interview).  
 
The protests were directed simultaneously towards the World Bank and the IMF and 
towards the government, although the government naturally was seen as the prime 
responsible for the crisis. The government was blamed for creating a situation of 
crisis which necessitated drastic reform measures as put forward by the financial 
institutions. For a short time after the introduction of Alassane Ouattara as an 
economic advisor, there even existed a hope in the Ivorian opposition that this IMF 
official would “tidy things up” in the corrupt practices of the government (Blé Guirao 
2004, interview). Very soon, however, Ouattara became immensely unpopular, and 
simultaneously the popular perception of the IMF and World Bank deteriorated.  
In the view of Jarret and Mahieu, the World Bank and the IMF exercised a maximum 
degree of influence over Côte d’Ivoire during what they call “the government of the 
IMF boys”.23 (Jarret and Mahieu 2002:30)    
 
While the economic crisis was already threatening the old system of legitimation and 
reducing policy space, the intervention of the World Bank and the IMF in 1989-90 
deprived the state further of political choice and revealed the almost total lack of 
autonomy of the Ivorian state (ibid.). Jarret and Mahieu describe the economic failure 
of the “IMF boys” as largely due to their democratic incapacity (ibid.:30f). Allassane 
Ouattara’s identification with the IFIs is likely to have contributed to his 
 
23 1990-1993; the years when Ouattara was Prime Minister 
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 unpopularity. Without doubt, his IMF past contributed to his image as a “foreign 
intruder”.24 The introduction of nationalism in the political left around 1990 further 
was a defensive reaction to Alassane Ouattara as a “foreign intruder” in Ivorian 
politics as well as to the strategic use of the immigrant population by the PDCI.  
 
The destabilizing effect of the Ouattara government was, however, not only a direct 
effect of the unpopularity of the government itself, but in addition an effect of the 
reduced policy space for this government. The “maximum degree of influence” over 
the country described by Jarret and Mahieu implies a weakening of the state that is 
likely to be destabilizing in the long run. There seems to be little doubt that the 
influence of the IFIs in this period had the effect of weakening the state’s capacity to 
make independent policy choices. This was one step in the gradual delegitimation of 
the state in the eyes of the public, a process that cannot be explained simply by the 
death of Houphouët.  
 
Economic reforms were a major area of contestation in the years following the first 
multiparty elections, and contributed to the radicalization of the student movement 
and the broader movement of the left. The most contested reforms were in the 
education sector, including cuts in teachers’ salaries, attacks on student welfare, and 
stricter requirements for admission to higher education and for entering the civil 
service for university graduates. But other reforms related to liberalization and 
privatization efforts were also controversial issues.  
 
For the students, deteriorating living and studying conditions were a direct result of 
World Bank-induced reforms. They gave rise to a movement of opposition that 
developed into a violent and increasingly nationalist movement. Following Yacouba 
Konaté and Kouassi Yao, we see the extreme expressions of violence in today’s 
conflict as partly attributable to a culture of violence that developed at the University 
of Abidjan in the early 1990s. 
 
24 ”In the beginning it was like: ‘A financier, he comes like that from New York, he wants to disturb us here, he doesn’t 
know the country…’”  (Konate Sidiki 2004: Interview)   
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However, it is not obvious that the development of this culture can be blamed on the 
economic policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF. No doubt, the main 
reason for the early radicalization of Fesci was the brutality with which they were met 
by the regime. Their militantism was also, as we have seen, very much a campaign to 
get rid of the sitting regime and to achieve democracy. Yet if we are to take seriously 
the Fesci militants’ claim that they were campaigning for student welfare, it seems 
obvious that the rights they were fighting to protect was under attack as much from 
the IFIs as from the regime itself. The student welfare aspect of the protests was also 
the reason why they had so broad support: Even children of PDCI supporters 
protested when their study grants were removed. 
5.1.1 Elite level: Ethnic manipulations 
At the elite level, the political strategy of Ivoirité can be seen as a strategy from the 
political elite for avoiding discussion over economic matters. While each of the actors 
in the political elite have had their own specific political goals and specific strategies 
to meet these goals, all of them have seen a political discourse centered on national 
identity as advantageous to their own position. The economic crisis created a 
situation where the political leadership was increasingly faced with social discontent 
and protest, and new strategies were needed to maintain political support.  
 
From the PDCI elite’s perspective, Ivoirité was a response to a situation where the 
state, and thus the party, was losing its position as provider of peace and welfare for 
the people. Unable to live up to the position the party had made itself and which also 
enjoyed foreign support (particularly French), the party needed new strategies, and 
the answer was a radicalization of Houphouët’s idea of Ivorian “uniqueness”.  
 
From the FPIs side, its xenophobic policy developed in parallel with a deep criticism 
of the economic policies of the PDCI regime. The FPI opposed the ruling party’s 
French-oriented policies, and wanted to loosen French grips on the Ivorian economy. 
At the same time, they were deeply skeptical of the economic reform policies 
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 promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. Their political argumentation was, and 
still is, an anti-imperialist, as well as xenophobic, nationalist one.  
 
The RDR from the outset profiled themselves on economic liberalism and public 
sector reform, but soon turned their focus to the political and economic exclusion of 
foreigners and the “North”, capitalizing on the growing discontent among 
immigrants, northerners, and Muslims.  
5.1.2 Popular level: Deprivation and protest 
At the popular level, the increased level of protest and political violence is clearly 
related to decreasing standards of living following the economic stagnation. Reform 
policies in many instances aggravated the negative impact of the economic crisis. In 
accordance with the notion of progressive deprivation, continued growth for two 
decades had created an expectation that Ivorians would not experience poverty and 
social problems to the extent that the countries’ neighbors did. The shift from growth 
and relatively high living standards to stagnation, weakened welfare policies and 
increasing poverty created frustration and provoked social unrest. This is particularly 
true in the cities, where extreme poverty had been practically non-existent but from  
the late 1980s became a serious issue. Through the use of the Ivoirité discourse, 
popular discontent and protest has increasingly been channeled into ethnic and 
nationalist violence. However, the anti-imperialist aspect of the conflict surfaces 
frequently, as in the November 2004 anti-French demonstrations that led to an almost 
total evacuation of European citizens.  
 
In the forest zone, the liberalization in the cocoa and coffee sector increased poverty, 
bringing to the fore tensions between locals and immigrants. Poverty rose, living 
conditions deteriorated in relation to expectations and to past levels, and the 
aggression was turned towards the relatively economically successful immigrants, 
who were perceived to have been unjustly privileged by the government. Moreover, 
generational conflicts arose as young people returned to their villages after failing to 
find employment in the cities. This group faced a double disappointment: First, 
higher education and exposure to higher living standards in the cities had created an 
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 expectation of a standard of living that they were unable to obtain as they graduated 
and could not find jobs. Second, upon returning to their villages, they faced problems 
in gaining access to what they perceived as “their” land, as the older generation 
preferred selling to immigrants. Following Chauveau, we see today’s high level of 
tensions in the forest zone as partly a result of the economic crisis and particularly of 
the liberalization of the agricultural sector. Economic and social crisis in the cities 
further accelerated rural conflict, as returned city dwellers became a destabilizing 
factor.  
 
Recalling Figure 1 in Chapter 1.3, we expected economic developments and 
structural adjustment to influence political legitimacy and stability through three 
intermediate variables: a) ethnicity and neo-patrimonial distribution, b) poverty and 
inequality, and c) political accountability. Concerning the first, economic crisis 
brought to the fore tensions between different ethnic groups as well as between locals 
and immigrants, like what happened in the forest zone. Most importantly, the 
economic crisis limited the policy space for political leaders and left the choice of 
ethnic and nationalist policies as an attractive basis on which to build political 
support. Beverly Crawford’s institutional perspective on ethnicity, highlighting the 
globalization and liberalization policies’ effect of triggering ethnic policies, illustrates 
well what has happened in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1990s: When the state was deprived 
of economic resources, it was also deprived of its primary tool for upholding a social 
contract and thereby stability. Crawford focuses the role of “ethnic entrepreneurs” in 
these circumstances, e.g. representatives of unprivileged groups who threaten the 
weakened state through ethnic policies; however, in Côte d’Ivoire, power holders 
themselves have also profited on ethnic policies. Neo-patrimonial patterns of 
distribution along ethnic and other informal lines, as well as the option of “buying” 
political support through the use of state resources, were attacked both by the 
economic crisis itself, and by liberal economic reforms. Looking at the second 
variable, poverty and inequality, the economic crisis enhanced poverty. The increase 
in extreme poverty was particularly strong between 1987 and 1990 and between 1993 
and 1996 (see Figure 3, Chapter 4.2.1). While poverty spread to urban areas in the 
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 early 1990s, unpopular reforms reinforced the feeling of deprivation. Coupled with 
frustration of a political elite that went clear of the negative impacts of the crisis, this 
caused social discontent and protest. Finally, political accountability has been 
threatened above all by the adjustment reforms. The weakening of state institutions 
resulting from the attacks on public spending and state bureaucracies, left the state 
with weakened capacity to manage the challenges caused by economic deterioration. 
The negative impact of economic crisis and restructuring may hence have been 
aggravated by the simultaneous weakening of state institutions brought by increasing 
dependency of external institutions.  
5.2 The Limitations of Economic Explanations 
While this study has pointed to effects of economic crisis and deprivation on political 
destabilization, economic factors are not sufficient explanations of political 
breakdown. Effects of economic changes on political stability are necessarily 
mediated by political choices, which cannot be explained on the basis of economic 
factors alone. Thus elites respond to the economic situation of the country, but still 
make a choice of strategies to meet the economic challenges. Likewise, while great 
changes in living conditions are likely to cause public reaction, the form and reach of 
reactions depend on political opportunities and constraints and can vary greatly 
between societies and situations.  
 
Elite strategies such as Ivoirité, which weakened political legitimacy and destabilized 
the Ivorian society, were responses to a legitimacy crisis caused by economic 
degradation, but were, equally important, the choice of political leaders. In face of 
weakening state institutions and a reduced capacity to formulate political projects, 
leaders chose the “easy option” of appealing to ethnic and nationalistic sentiments. 
Likewise, while popular protest and violence were responses to an economic and 
social crisis, the character of the protest, particularly the nationalistic form that 
political action took, was the result of historical patterns of migration and political 
and institutional legacies of domination, privilege and conflict, as well as of elite 
manipulation.   
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Are the mechanisms of relative deprivation leading to violence that we have seen in 
Côte d’Ivoire representative of countries experiencing dramatic economic 
degradation? In Zambia, extreme poverty rose from 45 to 74 percent from 1987 to 
1993 (Figure 3, Chapter 4.2.1). This is an extreme economic deterioration that did not 
produce a destabilization of the kind that has happened in Côte d’Ivoire. Trends in 
growth and poverty cannot alone explain political breakdown. Regime stability also 
depends on how the political elite manages the economic and social crisis, and 
equally important on the response of the opposition, civil society and other groups. 
Political strategies (both of the elite and the public) are influenced by many other 
factors in addition to economy, such as demographic factors, institutional factors, and 
political culture.   
 
We have shown that economic conditions were important in shaping the elite 
strategies as well as the public political action that led to destabilization in Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that a dramatic economic 
deterioration will necessarily lead to breakdown. Neither does it mean that conflict 
and political breakdown cannot primarily be caused by other factors. Rather, the 
analysis shows the importance of looking into the interconnectedness of economic, 
social, political and institutional factors. The Ivorian case illustrates that in order to 
understand political conflict we need to look behind appearances and analyze the 
economic and social conditions in which political strategies are chosen.  
5.3 Implications for Policy 
The study has shown that economic change and dramatic economic reforms can 
trigger political destabilization and conflict.  Economic reform policies should hence 
not only consider their potential economic consequences, but also the social and 
political context into which reforms are to be introduced. A profound understanding 
of social and political dynamics is a prerequisite for successful reform. The potential 
for destabilization is neither a function of growth nor poverty, but depends on 
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 changes in people’s living conditions, changes in relations between groups, and of 
how economic changes affect existing conflicts.  
 
The effects of political reform further depend upon the strength and legitimacy of the 
state and how these are affected by reform. We have argued that the high level of 
dependency upon the IFIs during the Ouattara government contributed to a weakened 
institutional capacity, leading to a delegitimation of the state that was destabilizing in 
the long run. The effect that reforms have on state legitimacy depends on the power 
relation between the state and the lending institutions. In the 1980s, the Ivorian state 
had considerable bargaining power in face of the IFIs, and was able to put off and to a 
certain degree manipulate the outcome of reform processes (Contamin and Fauré 
1990). The strongest example of this was Houphouët’s ability to avoid the 
devaluation of the CFA Franc during his presidency. Already from 1989, however, 
the severity of the economic crisis weakened the independence of the Ivorian state, 
and the IFIs got a much more direct role in policymaking. The abandonment of the 
agricultural price guarantee system, leading to the halving of cocoa and coffee prices, 
as well as severe wage cuts, were signs that Houphouët finally had to give in to 
World Bank and IMF demands that he had been resisting for a long time.  
 
The weakening of institutions that we have shown as a consequence of IFI reforms 
should leave us extremely cautious to the effects of introducing reforms from the 
outside. Moreover, institutional strengthening should be a major priority of policy 
reforms, especially when other aspects of the reforms face the state with new political 
and administrative challenges. The current PRSP programs do put a stronger 
emphasis on institutional strengthening, capacity building and accountability than did 
the earlier structural adjustment programs. However, if these concepts are –or are 
perceived to be- defined externally, they might not get us very far from where we 
started. While accountability in itself is undoubtedly a valuable cause, it immediately 
raises the question: Accountability to whom? If governments are perceived to be 
more accountable to external actors than to the population of their countries, this 
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 might well have the effect of weakening, instead of strengthening, internal political 
legitimacy.  
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 Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
The interviews were conducted in February and March 2004, in Dakar (Feb. 17 and 18) and Abidjan.  
Feb. 17: Faliouo Ndiaye, Department of Modern Literature, Faculty of Arts, University of Dakar  
Feb. 18: Amady Ali Dieuf, Economist, Center for Applied Economic Research, Dakar  
Feb. 24: Nyamien Messou Nguessan, President of Synares  
 With Mark Affilance Zamblé 
Feb. 24: Venance Konan, journalist, Fraternité Matin 
 With Mark Affilance Zamblé 
Feb. 27: Francis Akindès, Professor of Sociology, IRD 
March 9: Ori Boizo, Member of Parliament, FPI and researcher at the IRD    
March 11: Blé Guirao, President of J-UDPCI, Fesci President 1995-1996 
 With representative from the UDPCI 
March 11: Kouassi Yao, Professor of History, University of Cocody 
March 11:  Guedé Guina, Major of Daloa Municipality, RDR 
 With representative from the RDR 
March 11: Konaté Sidiki, spokesperson for the New Forces, former Fesci activist  
 With Yoro Bi Ta Raymond 
March 14: Touré Moussa Zéguen, President GPP; former Fesci activist  
 With Yoro Bi Ta Raymond and three life guards   
March 15: Richard Doffounsou, Resident Economist, World Bank, Abidjan 
 With Rigmor Skeie Koti, Norwegian Embassy in Côte d’Ivoire  
March 15: Alain Fabrice Ekpo, Economist, IMF 
 With Rigmor Skeie Koti 
March 15: Kouakou Mathias, Secretary General of PPS Youth, former Fesci activist  
March 17: Francis Guenon, French Embassy in Côte d’Ivoire  
March 17: Nicole Doué, member, RDR, former Fesci activist 
 With Yoro Bi Ta Raymond 
March 19: Olivier Tanoh, Director, Division of Economic Analysis, Ministry of Finance 
 With Rigmor Skeie Koti 
March 19: Laurent Djaha, Privatization Committee 
March 19: Prof. Ebagnerin, Professor of Sociology, University of Cocody 
March 19: Mr Sernowitch, Director, French Development Agency, Côte d’Ivoire 
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 March 21: Koné Zobila, Economist, President of Scientific Council of Attac Côte  
 d’Ivoire, member of PCRCI 
 With Yoro Bi Ta Raymond 
March 22: Barthelemy Kotchy, Atlantic University; former Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Cocody 
March 23: Lanciné Sylla, Ministry of Administrative Reform; Political Sociologist; Honorary Dean of Faculty 
of Arts, University of Cocody 
March 23: Kouakou Kan, BNTD 
March 23: Alexandre Assamien, Ministry of Finance  
 
Key informant: Yoro Bi Ta Raymond, Vice President of Attac Côte d’Ivoire; Office Manager at the PCRCI 
(Communist Revolutionary Party of Côte d’Ivoire)     
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 Appendix 2: Structural Adjustment Programs in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Macroeconomic Programs: 
 
Year Program Major Policies 
1981  PAS I 
(World Bank) 
- Improve instruments of macroeconomic governance and 
governance of public and para-public sectors 
- Public spending reductions, particularly in education 
sector  
- Augmentation of prices paid to agricultural producers 
- Harmonization of industrial import tariffs 
- Abolition of industrial import quotas  
1883  PAS II 
(World Bank) 
- Improved control of state investments; abandonment of 
some unprofitable projects 
- Reform of public enterprises 
- Reductions of agricultural subsidies 
- Augmentation of prices paid to agricultural producers 
- Six sugar complexes shut down 
- Reform and cost reductions in housing sector  
1986 PAS III 
(World Bank) 
- Follow-up of PAS I and II in public enterprises, 
agriculture, industry and housing 
- Reform of the energy sector  
1981 Accord de facilité  
Elargie 
(IMF) 
 
 +6 confirmation  
agreements 
 
1994-
1996  
FASR I 
(IMF) 
- VAT reductions 
- Wage reductions in public sector 
- Limitation of new recruitments in public administraton 
- Privatization of public enterprises 
- Price liberalizations 
- Suppression of export subsidies 
- Promotion of private sector through new investments 
code, creation of an industrial restructuring fund etc. 
- Privatization of railways 
- Priority to primary health care 
- Reorientation of education expenses to primary 
education 
1998-
2000  
FASR II 
(IMF) 
- Increase in private savings 
- Further privatizations and reform of public enterprises 
- Further price liberalizations 
- improvement of health facilities, especially in rural areas 
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 Sector Programs (World Bank): 
 
Year Program Sector  Major Policies 
1989 PASA Agriculture - Mdification of price guarantee system for coffee and 
cocoa, halving of prices to producers 
- Reforms in palm oil, rice, (élévage), forestry, and 
cotton sectors 
1980 PASE Energy Privatization of the Ivorian Electricity Company 
(CIE) 
1990 PASEA Water and Sanitation Reform of SODECI (water) 
1991 PASFI Financial Sector - State withdrew from banking sector  
- Liberalization of monetary policy 
1991 PVRH Human Resources - Reduction of salaries for new teachers at primary, 
secondary and university levels 
- Reduction of student allowances 
- Restrictions on access to public administration for 
university graduates 
- Thransfer of some university faculties to Abobo 
(Abidjan suburb) and Bouaké 
- Interruption of construction of Abidjan hospital  
- Fusion of ministries of health and education 
- Priority to generic medicines  
1991 PASCO Competition - Improved incentives for export 
- Deregulation of labor market 
- Simplification of procedures for creation of 
enterprises  
- Price liberalization (from 1994) 
- Abolition of Non-Tariff Barriers (from 1994) 
1994 PAS-FI Financial Sector  
1994 PAS-RH Human Resources  
1994 CARE Economic Recovery   
1995 CASA Agriculture  - Privatizations of rubber (1994-1995), wheat/flour 
(1995), palm oil (1996), sugar (1997), CIDT (1998) 
- Liberalization of coffee (1998) and cocoa (1999) 
- Gradual dissolution of the CAISTAB (completed 
1999) 
1996 PAS-
DSP 
Private Sector -Judicial reform 
-Rationalization of customs system 
-Further deregulation of labor market 
-Export promotion  
1996 PAS 
Transport 
Transport   
     Sources: Kouakou (2004), Falle (undated), World Bank (1999)   
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 Appendix 3: Heads of State in Côte d’Ivoire  
 
1960-1993 Félix Houphouët-Boigny PDCI 
1993-1999  Henri Konan Bédié PDCI 
1999-2000  General Robert Gueï CNSP 
2000- Laurent Gbagbo FPI 
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